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Abstract 
 
IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: A REVOLUTION FOR THE SOUL OF THE 
SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION 
 
Ryan S. Parsons  
B.A., Appalachian State University 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
 
 
Chairperson: James R. Goff, Jr. 
 
 
 The Inerrancy Controversy (1979-1990) in the Southern Baptist Convention 
provides an important case study to consider the relationship of religion and politics. 
Contextualizing this controversy vis-à-vis several preceding Southern Baptist 
skirmishes, it appears to have had theological roots extending to the early 1960s. By 
the early 1970s, a faction of disaffected Southern Baptists began to decry the 
denominational leaderships’ ambiguous stances on abortion, women’s rights, and 
biblical inerrancy. From the mid to late 1970s, this faction evolved into an organized 
coalition, forged relationships with important figures in the blossoming Religious 
Right, and prepared to launch a strategic campaign to oust Southern Baptist leaders. 
During the coup d’état of the 1980s, the coalition rallied around adherence to the 
error-free nature and unquestionable authority of the Bible, which allowed them to 
mute any opposition. Thus, while the resistance fought strenuously for the freedom of 
interpretation, they failed to muster sufficient resources and organization to repel the 
new coalition. In the end, the denominational leadership undercut the resistance with 
 v 
two ill-fated proposals for peace. Consequently, the coalition seized power in 1990 
and effectively redefined the denomination’s theology, polity, and relationship to the 
surrounding culture. At its core, the Inerrancy Controversy was a battle over what it 
meant to be Southern Baptist. 
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Introduction: The Inerrancy Controversy 
Jerry Falwell’s statement in 1998 that “there is no reason at all for any Bible-
believing independent conservative Baptist church not to become a part of the SBC” would 
have shocked his audience if he had uttered it twenty years earlier.1 However, the Southern 
Baptist Convention had witnessed substantial changes since the tumultuous Inerrancy 
Controversy erupted in June of 1979. When Falwell inaugurated the Moral Majority during 
that same month, it had virtually nothing in common with the Convention. In fact, the Moral 
Majority stood firmly to the conservative right of the religio-political spectrum, whereas the 
SBC proudly embraced the ambiguous middle. It was taboo for the Convention to take strong 
stances for or against issues such as biblical inerrancy, abortion, and women’s ordination. In 
stark contrast, the SBC took hardline stances against abortion and women’s ordination a mere 
two decades later, justifying these stances via their adherence to biblical inerrancy. This 
erratic reversal gave reason to wonder: what had happened to the Southern Baptist 
Convention? 
In his work Constantine and the Bishops: The Politics of Intolerance, Roman 
historian H. A. Drake remarked that the scholars who most vociferously asserted Emperor 
Constantine’s political ambitions also questioned his religious sincerity. Certainly, theology 
and politics can be studied independently of one another. When put into practice, however, 
theology “falls subject to the rules of politics.” Since politics is simply “the art of winning 
agreement, of mobilizing support, of gaining consensus,” Drake argued, “it has nothing to 
                                                        
1 Charles C. McLaughlin, “Why Don’t They Just Hand The SBC Over To Falwell?” Texas Baptists Committed, 
September 1998, accessed November 11, 2015, 
http://www.txbc.org/1998Journals/September%201998/Sept98WhyDontThey.html. 
 2 
say about a given individual’s religious sincerity or lack of same.”2 In other words, historians 
may scrutinize the manifestations of Constantine’s theology in Roman politics without 
questioning the sincerity of his personal adherence to Christianity. 
The SBC’s presidential election at the 1979 annual convention in Houston, Texas, 
marked the formal beginning of a partisan campaign to alter the form and function of the 
Southern Baptist Convention. Inerrantists3, the organizers of this campaign, rallied around 
adherence to the error-free nature and unquestionable authority of the Bible. The moderates4 
opposed inerrantist authoritarianism and claimed that all Southern Baptists had the freedom 
to interpret the Bible as they saw fit. Over the course of twelve years, the primary emphasis 
of the annual convention shifted largely from denominational business to presidential 
elections. Whichever party won the presidency was allotted two years to appoint their allies 
to key committees that in turn could influence who got hired to or fired from the many 
boards and agencies of the SBC. This was a complicated process, however, and several 
presidential victories would be necessary in order to accomplish significant changes in the 
Convention.  
Although inerrantists claimed to be motivated by their zeal for biblical orthodoxy, 
moderates suspected that this was a political coup in religious guise. After inerrantist 
ringleader Paul Pressler publicly remarked in 1980 that his coalition sought control of the 
Convention’s trustees, moderates began to organize a counter-campaign to keep the SBC out 
                                                        
2 H. A. Drake, Constantine and the Bishops: The Politics of Intolerance (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2000), xvi. 
3 Although scholars have used the term fundamentalist to denote these controversial figures, inerrantists loathe 
the derogatory connotations of that term. Moreover, conservative might imply that none of their opponents were 
theologically conservative. Inerrantist captures the spirit of their campaign in that they saw themselves fighting 
a righteous campaign centered on the inerrancy of the Bible. Inerrantists tended to be laity activists and 
prominent pastors. 
4 Although this group did not refer to themselves as moderates until the mid-1980s, moderate best captures the 
spirit of their opposition to inerrantists. Moderates tended to be professors and pastors. 
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of inerrantists’ hands. Whereas elections at the annual conventions had previously been 
popularity contests between several candidates, they gradually transformed into competitions 
between inerrantist and moderate candidates. That inerrantists vocally decried abortion and 
lobbied for governmental legislation to prohibit it raised the ire of moderates, who had 
traditionally upheld a strict separation between church and state. Inerrantists’ resemblance to 
Falwell and other leaders in the Religious Right convinced moderates that they were bringing 
hardball politics into the Convention. In 1984, after Pressler was named to the Executive 
Committee, one of the most powerful posts in the Convention, even a few agency heads5 
joined the moderate resistance. 
The overall ambivalence of agency heads, however, ultimately doomed moderates. In 
1981, shortly after Cecil Sherman led moderates contesting the reelection of an inerrantist 
president, two high-ranking members of the Executive Committee chastised him and 
instructed him to step down. Rather than join Sherman’s group in 1983, the director of the 
Christian Life Commission worked independently of them to oppose inerrantists at the 1984 
convention. By late 1984, when inerrantists had already won six consecutive presidential 
victories, a few seminary presidents and the president of the Foreign Mission Board finally 
joined moderates. However, many agency heads still refused to get directly involved in the 
controversy. One agency head’s proposal for a nonpartisan Peace Committee at the 1985 
convention actually helped inerrantists achieve their goals. When seminary presidents 
presented the Glorieta Statement to the Peace Committee in 1986, this de facto surrender 
allowed inerrantists to exploit the committee. Containing the Glorieta Statement, the Peace 
                                                        
5 Agency heads were the prestigious members of power-holding posts in the SBC who historically bore most of 
the responsibility for building the bureaucratic structures of the Convention; these are also referred to as 
denominational leaders. Agency heads comprised seminary presidents, presidents of mission boards, and 
leaders of the Executive Committee, to name a few. 
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Committee’s report at the 1987 convention vindicated inerrantists and substantially 
weakened the posture of moderates, who would fight an uphill battle until their final defeat in 
1990. 
Thesis and Layout 
The Inerrancy Controversy was a battle over theology and political control. Deeper 
still, it was a battle over traditions. Agency heads and moderates most highly valued doctrinal 
liberty while inerrantists prized unwavering theological conservatism. Fittingly, the former 
boasted about the theological diversity in SBC seminaries and the latter loathed it. On 
another level, this controversy was fought over the relationship of the SBC to the 
surrounding culture. Inerrantists interpreted the separation of church and state differently 
than did agency heads and moderates, particularly with regard to social issues. Although the 
latter felt that Southern Baptists should allow for difference of opinion on these issues, 
inerrantists deeply resented anything other than explicit opposition to what they perceived as 
progressive trends. A multi-faceted chronological account of the controversy reveals that 
inerrantists’ revolution for the soul of the SBC was theological, political, and cultural. Their 
rigid adherence to biblical inerrancy colored their perceptions of how SBC polity should 
function and how the Convention should respond to progressive cultural trends. In the end, 
the Inerrancy Controversy was a battle over what it meant to be Southern Baptist. 
Chapter one provides a brief history of the Southern Baptist Convention, tracing the 
rise of a sophisticated bureaucracy, and summarizes the arguments of several notable 
scholars of the Inerrancy Controversy. Chapter two demonstrates that, over the duration of 
the 1960s and 1970s, Broadman Press, the SBC seminaries, and the agency heads’ responses 
to the Elliott and Broadman Controversies took center stage in convincing inerrantists that 
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the leadership looked favorably upon theological diversity. In direct correlation to their 
concerns that agency heads would facilitate the theological downfall of the SBC for the sake 
of doctrinal liberty, inerrantists began to network with one another and organize the skeleton 
of a campaign to seize the Convention.  
As chapter three establishes, from 1979 to 1990 inerrantists launched a cleverly 
devised offensive that replaced the leadership of the SBC with only those who espoused 
biblical inerrancy. Due to unprecedented grassroots support, moderates’ lack of organization, 
and agency heads’ penchant for compromise, inerrantists became the new leaders of the 
Convention. That it took inerrantists over ten years to secure their victory evidenced the 
extent of power traditionally held by agency heads. Chapter four reveals that the skirmishes 
over abortion and women’s rights between 1971 and 1990 were divided along the same lines 
as the battle over biblical inerrancy. Leaders of the Christian Life Commission and Baptist 
Joint Committee on Public Affairs became inerrantists’ primary targets due to their refusal to 
condemn progressive trends. Agency heads’ judicious approaches to these controversies 
infuriated inerrantists. Thus, inerrantists proceeded to lobby social issues on the national 
stage, finding an alliance with Jerry Falwell and other influential evangelicals. These liaisons 
demonstrated that inerrantists were just one part of a burgeoning religious right.  
 6 
 
Chapter One: Origins and Interpretations 
Historiography 
When Walter Shurden wrote Not a Silent People: Controversies that Have Shaped 
Southern Baptists, he did so in the midst of a sweeping current of discontented traditional 
conservatism which would soon usher in a de facto revolution in the Southern Baptist 
Convention. While working as a professor of religion at Carson-Newman College in 1972, 
Shurden published this book in an attempt to promote Baptists’ denominational heritage as a 
source of pride. He saw Southern Baptists’ propensity towards religious controversy as “an 
index of how much [they] care.”6 By detailing several controversies between the founding of 
the SBC and a controversy surrounding Broadman Press in 1970, Shurden reminded and 
consoled Baptist readers that controversy was a Baptist tradition. He contended, however, 
that no decade in Southern Baptist history had seen such controversy as that of late. Between 
the Elliott Controversy of 1961 and the Broadman Controversy of 1970, both dealing with 
progressive interpretations of the book of Genesis, the SBC annual conventions experienced 
unprecedented chaos.7 
Despite the exhausting theological tensions mounting in the annual conventions, 
Shurden maintained that the Elliott and Broadman Controversies were still disparate 
controversies. Presenting the bias that would characterize his place in the later Inerrancy 
Controversy, he begrudged inerrantists for their dogged insistence that “to deny the 
historicity of biblical events (or to refuse to take the Bible literally) is the same as denying 
                                                        
6 Walter Shurden, Not a Silent People: Controversies that Have Shaped Southern Baptists (Macon, Georgia: 
Smith & Helwys Publishing, Inc., 1995), ix. 
7 Shurden, Silent, 69. 
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the Bible as the reliable Word of God.”8 Moderates and agency heads, on the other hand, 
rightly upheld that the importance of the Bible lay in its message, not its literary nature. Little 
did Shurden know that this very argument would comprise the nucleus of the impending 
schism. After teaching church history for several years at Southern Seminary, Shurden took a 
job teaching Christianity at Mercer University in Georgia and became a moderate activist in 
the Inerrancy Controversy. Throughout the controversy, he compiled a significant collection 
of primary materials, which he eventually published in 1996 as Going for the Jugular: A 
Documentary History of the SBC Holy War.9 In 1993, he published an invaluable collection 
of articles from moderates in the controversy, The Struggle for the Soul of the SBC: 
Moderate Responses to the Fundamentalist Movement.10 
By the time he republished Not A Silent People in 1995, with the addition of a chapter 
on the recent controversy, Shurden suggested that inerrantists had won the conflict because 
of five factors: they spoke with passion; their focus on biblical inerrancy was both concise 
and simple; they had many friends amongst the religious right; they possessed organizational 
unity; and their leaders had large followings.11 In short, he argued that inerrantists were 
successful because they persuaded more messengers to attend the conventions and vote for 
their candidates than did moderates.12 Yet, he also claimed that in all matters theological, 
ideological, ecclesiological, cultural, ecumenical, and denominational, inerrantists embodied 
the antithesis of traditional Southern Baptists.13   
                                                        
8 Shurden, Silent, 69, 79-80. 
9 Walter Shurden, ed., Going for the Jugular: A Documentary History of the SBC Holy War (Macon, Georgia: 
Mercer University Press, 1996). 
10 Walter Shurden, ed., The Struggle for the Soul of the SBC: Moderate Responses to the Fundamentalist 
Movement, (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1993). 
11 Shurden, Silent, 103-107. 
12 Shurden, Silent, 102. 
13 Shurden, Silent, 107-108. 
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Serving as a writer-in-residence at Hannibal LaGrange College in the mid to late 
1980s, journalist James Hefley extensively chronicled both events of the Inerrancy 
Controversy and its precedents. Regardless of his attempt to portray the denominational 
conflict in an objective manner, his six-volume Truth in Crisis series became known as the 
inerrantist account. When Hefley released volume one in 1986, the Sunday School Board 
refused to publish it on the basis that it would further polarize the Convention. Paradoxically, 
the perceived banning of his book resulted in backyard sales at inerrantists’ churches.14 In 
point of fact, virtually all of the big players on the inerrantist side of the controversy came to 
endorse Hefley’s series, and for good reason. By tracing the origins of the controversy to the 
theological progressivism that blossomed in the SBC between the 1920s and 1970s, he 
validated inerrantists’ claims that their goal to reclaim the SBC for traditional orthodoxy 
precipitated their campaign. In other words, as the title of his series suggested, the crisis in 
the Convention arose over what inerrantists perceived to be truth. Inerrantists thus received 
vindication from Hefley as crusaders for biblical truth. 
Sociologist Nancy Ammerman of Emory University began researching the Inerrancy 
Controversy around the same time as Hefley. Unlike Hefley and Shurden, Ammerman did 
not have a clear stake in the controversy. This likely allowed for her Baptist Battles: Social 
Change and Religious Conflict in the Southern Baptist Convention, published in 1990, to 
become a relatively balanced account, giving both inerrantists and moderates a fair hearing. 
Ammerman compiled a socio-historical account of the Convention, in which she found that a 
sizeable majority of Southern Baptists indeed agreed with the inerrantists theologically, and 
substantiated their suspicions that agency heads had built a near-impregnable fortress, which 
                                                        
14 James Hefley, The Conservative Resurgence in the Southern Baptist Convention (Hannibal, Missouri: 
Hannibal Books, 1991), 343-344. 
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in turn left grassroots Baptists and inerrantists feeling alienated by their Convention. 
Moreover, she documented cultural and theological differences that existed between 
moderates and inerrantists.15  
Bill Leonard, a professor of church history at Southern Seminary throughout the 
duration of the Inerrancy Controversy, published God’s Last and Only Hope: The 
Fragmentation of the Southern Baptist Convention in 1990. Like Shurden, Leonard stressed 
that the SBC had always existed on the precipice of division over doctrine and practice. 
However, an ethereal concept, called “grand compromise” by Leonard, purportedly protected 
the Convention from falling into the hands of “ideologues on the right or left.”16 A sense of 
adherence to southern identity, a dedication to missions, and loyalty to the SBC gave 
Southern Baptists the tools to avoid schism. According to Leonard, theology had been 
defined in such a way as to establish Baptist identity. Consequently, doctrinal liberty thrived 
in the SBC, becoming a core Baptist tradition. Although the grand compromise served as a 
denominational cohesive, it paradoxically came to foster theological disunity, which drove 
the Convention apart.17  
Ralph Elliott, a former professor at Midwestern Seminary, whose 1961 book The 
Message of Genesis catalyzed a theological controversy, published his memoir in 1992.18 
Entitled The “Genesis Controversy” and Continuity in Southern Baptist Chaos: A Eulogy for 
a Great Tradition, his memoir provided some of the keenest insights as to the origins of the 
Inerrancy Controversy. In emphasizing that his controversial book represented a relatively 
                                                        
15 Nancy Ammerman, Baptist Battles: Social Change and Religious Conflict in the Southern Baptist Convention 
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1990). 
16 Bill Leonard, God’s Last and Only Hope: The Fragmentation of the Southern Baptist Convention (Grand 
Rapids, Michigan: W. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1990), 8. 
17 Leonard, 8-9. 
18 Ralph Elliott, The “Genesis Controversy” and Continuity in Southern Baptist Chaos: A Eulogy for a Great 
Tradition (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1992). 
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conservative interpretation of the biblical book of Genesis, Elliott illumined the secretive 
dealings within Southern Baptist seminaries. Seminary professors’ usage of what he termed 
“double-speak,” couching one’s research in such a way that did not threaten the more 
traditional beliefs of readers, ultimately assumed the responsibility for the Elliott 
Controversy. Because he chose to reveal rather than conceal his research, Elliott lost his job 
and received a professorate outside of the SBC. Furthermore, he perceived something that 
escaped the notice of many moderates: continuity existed between the Elliott, Broadman, and 
Inerrancy Controversies. As the ultimate insider to the Elliott Controversy, Elliott discerned 
that each of the three controversies were slightly different manifestations of the same 
conflict. 
The primary importance of Grady Cothen’s What Happened to the Southern Baptist 
Convention? A Memoir of the Controversy, published in 1993, lay in the prestige of its 
author.19 Cothen was the epitome of a denominational statesman, serving as a pastor, state 
executive secretary, seminary president, university president, and president of the Sunday 
School Board. When moderates submitted Cothen’s name for SBC president in 1984, his loss 
to inerrantist candidate Charles Stanley, perceived by many to be a denominational outsider, 
bewildered them. Being an insider and an agency head, Cothen’s access to interviews, 
archives, and documents of the Inerrancy Controversy made this memoir extremely valuable. 
He also provided great insider detail as to how the SBC agencies and boards functioned. 
Cothen’s lament over what happened to the Convention shed light upon the way that other 
agency heads likely saw the controversy. In addition, his 1995 sequel The New SBC: 
                                                        
19 Grady Cothen, What Happened to the Southern Baptist Convention? A Memoir of the Controversy (Macon, 
Georgia: Smith & Helwys, 1993). 
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Fundamentalism’s Impact on the Southern Baptist Convention traced the recent events of the 
Convention, arguing that the SBC had taken on a completely alien identity.20 
Historian David Morgan of Montevallo University broke new ground in 1996 with 
the provocative study The New Crusades, The New Holy Land: Conflict in the Southern 
Baptist Convention, 1969-1991. As his title suggested, Morgan argued that the controversy 
began in 1969, illumining key characters who contributed significantly to the inerrantist 
movement. Though many previous chroniclers and scholars of the controversy traditionally 
started their accounts with Adrian Rogers’s election as SBC president in 1979, Morgan’s 
research showed that inerrantist leaders Paul Pressler and Paige Patterson acquired their 
political platform and ten-year “take-over” strategy from M.O. Owens and William Powell; 
the latter two tried and failed to lead an inerrantist movement between 1969 and 1976. 
Morgan relied heavily on documents and tapes from the 1960s through the 1980s to argue 
that the controversy represented a battle for truth and a skillful use of politics. He also 
provided the framework with which future historians could analyze the intersection of the 
Inerrancy Controversy with the rise of the Religious Right.21  
Gregory Wills challenged the existing dialogue with his meticulous study of Southern 
Baptist discipline. Democratic Religion: Freedom, Authority, and Church Discipline in the 
Baptist South, 1785-1900 offered Georgia Baptists as a microcosm for understanding the 
extent of doctrinal liberty in SBC tradition. Wills wrote this subsequently published 
dissertation in 1996 on the campus of Southern Seminary, just prior to joining its faculty. His 
findings suggested that before the twentieth century Southern Baptists enjoyed not individual 
                                                        
20 Grady Cothen, The New SBC: Fundamentalism’s Impact on the Southern Baptist Convention (Macon, 
Georgia: Smith & Helwys, 1995). 
21 David Morgan, The New Crusades, the New Holy Land: Conflict in the Southern Baptist Convention, 1969-
1991 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1996). 
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but communal autonomy. In fact, churches and associations frequently used their authority to 
punish those who held doctrines that were deemed unorthodox. Wills contended therefore 
that the Inerrancy Controversy arose precisely because the Convention progressively 
abandoned its emphasis on discipline; that twentieth-century professors were allowed to 
teach the doctrines they did proved that the SBC had drastically shifted course.22 In 2009, 
Wills published what might be thought of as a complementary study to his dissertation, 
Southern Baptist Theological Seminary: 1859-2009.23 In this study, he argued that Southern 
Seminary entered a period of progressive theology in the 1900s that put its students in 
spiritual danger. However, under the presidential leadership of inerrantist R. Albert Mohler 
Jr. in the 1990s, Southern returned to the traditional conservative mold of its first president. 
David Stricklin, humanities professor at Lyon College, published Genealogy of 
Dissent: Southern Baptist Protest in the Twentieth Century in 1999. Stricklin successfully 
argued that the Inerrancy Controversy did not exist as a two-party struggle; to analyze it as an 
inerrantist versus moderate conflict did not allow a full understanding of all parties involved. 
By tracing the genealogy of moderates to the 1920s, Stricklin argued that agency heads had 
actually marginalized both moderate Southern Baptist dissenters and inerrantist Southern 
Baptist dissenters; because agency heads sought to promote peace between the two sides, 
they brought each side dangerously into conflict with each other. Whereas moderates desired 
to be at the forefront of changes in culture and theology, inerrantists wanted nothing more 
than to uphold traditional conservatism. When moderates’ views were promoted by agency 
                                                        
22 Gregory Wills, Democratic Religion: Freedom, Authority, and Church Discipline in the Baptist South, 1785-
1900 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
23 Gregory Wills, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary: 1859-2009 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009). 
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heads in the name of doctrinal liberty, inerrantists felt alienated and sought control of the 
entire denomination.24  
Judge Herman Paul Pressler III, one of the two ringleaders of the inerrantist 
movement, published A Hill on Which to Die: One Southern Baptist’s Journey in 1999. 
Pressler’s memoir, along with Cothen’s and Elliott’s, served as one of the three most 
important insider accounts of the Inerrancy Controversy. From the onset of the Elliott 
Controversy, the attorney-turned-judge became increasingly involved in Southern Baptist 
affairs. Concerned that progressive theology was eroding the traditionally conservative SBC, 
Pressler met with inerrantist co-leader Paige Patterson in 1967 and the two covenanted to 
organize a network of concerned Southern Baptists across the nation. By fall 1978, the duo 
possessed an alliance big enough to launch campaign efforts towards electing an inerrantist 
president the next summer. The most significant information in Pressler’s well-researched 
memoir was actually featured in the appendix. In this section, he included a few documents 
substantiating his claims that progressive theology existed to a substantial degree in the SBC 
seminaries and Baptist colleges. Pressler’s account in conjunction with Elliott’s made it clear 
that Stricklin’s moderates were seminary professors. That the agency heads did not dismiss 
professors’ views as heretical incensed Pressler, leading him and other inerrantists to assume 
the establishment to be corrupt.25  
Participant-observer Jerry Sutton served as chair of the Resolutions Committee at the 
convention in 1988, and thus became responsible for writing the controversial resolution “On 
the Priesthood of the Believer.” Inerrantists lauded this resolution, claiming that moderates 
                                                        
24 David Stricklin, A Genealogy of Dissent: Southern Baptist Protest in the Twentieth Century (Lexington: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 1999). 
25 Paul Pressler, A Hill on Which to Die: One Southern Baptist’s Journey (Nashville: Broadman & Holman 
Publishers, 1999). 
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and agency heads had used the priesthood doctrine to justify the rights of individuals to 
esteem and propagate heretical theologies. Sutton, having collected data from conventions he 
attended throughout the 1990s, published The Baptist Reformation: The Conservative 
Resurgence in the Southern Baptist Convention in 2000. Like Hefley, though he claimed 
objectivity in his writing, Sutton made it abundantly clear that he supported and celebrated 
the inerrantists’ successful campaign. Not surprisingly, his account received praise from 
virtually all inerrantist leaders in the SBC. In addition to providing crucial information 
concerning SBC conventions prior to and after the Inerrancy Controversy, he also delved into 
how the controversy affected the various seminaries and agencies. Given that most 
chroniclers charted the controversy no later than 1991, Sutton’s account provided an 
important vantage point for the subsequent decade.26  
 Baylor University historian Barry Hankins drew insightful conclusions based on his 
interviews with inerrantist leaders of the SBC. In Uneasy in Babylon: Southern Baptists and 
American Culture, published in 2002, Hankins discovered that inerrantists organized 
themselves as culture warriors.27 As a rule, they perceived the surrounding culture as much 
more threatening than did moderates. Indeed, tantamount to inerrantists’ theology was an 
unwavering stance against abortion. By necessity then, the controversy represented a series 
of both theological and political battles. Furthermore, Hankins adopted Stricklin’s argument 
that both inerrantists and moderates occupied the fringes of Convention life. Though both 
parties agreed on race, inerrantists resented moderates’ stances on abortion and gender; when 
agency heads appeared to support the views of the latter, inerrantists rallied in opposition. In 
                                                        
26 Jerry Sutton, The Baptist Reformation: The Conservative Resurgence in the Southern Baptist Convention 
(Nashville: Broadman & Holman Publishers, 2000). 
27 Barry Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon: Southern Baptist Conservatives and American Culture (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 2002).  
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addition, Hankins broke down inerrantists into three categories: populists, informed activists, 
and intellectuals. When he submitted a historiographical chapter to Keith Harper’s 2012 
edited collection Through A Glass Darkly: Contested Notions of Baptist Identity, Hankins 
noted that in order to move on to a depolarized understanding of the controversy, scholars 
ought to eschew the terms “fundamentalist” and “liberal.”28   
Cecil Sherman organized a group of moderates in 1980, the first formal resistance to 
the inerrantist movement. His Gatlinburg group became the nucleus of the moderate 
movement. After leading this group for a few years, Sherman abandoned his leadership role 
in order to join the Peace Committee, a device that agency heads proposed for making peace 
between inerrantists and moderates. When he published his memoir By My Own Reckoning 
in 2008, Sherman detailed his troubling experience on the Peace Committee. He recalled that 
inerrantists had controlled this committee from the start. In addition to illumining the agency 
heads’ sizeable burden of responsibility for the outcome of the controversy, Sherman 
revealed the lack of unity and resources faced by moderates. For that reason, a 
comprehensive understanding of the Inerrancy Controversy cannot be gleaned without his 
account.29  
A Concise History of the SBC, 1845 to 1961 
Sociologist Nancy Ammerman’s respected history of the SBC demonstrated that, in a 
sense, politics existed in the SBC long before the Inerrancy Controversy. A few hundred 
delegates, representing nine Baptist state conventions, gathered together in May of 1845 to 
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establish the SBC.30 Contentious fires of controversy over the rights of slaveholders to serve 
as missionaries brought these delegates to Augusta, Georgia, where they formally split from 
their northern brethren and created their own mission boards.31 This new denomination 
virtually encompassed the region that would soon become known as the Confederacy, 
comprising 4000 churches with an accumulated 350,000 members. By the 1970s, the SBC 
was the largest Protestant denomination in America. Then as now, the SBC existed on local, 
state, and national levels.  
However, with the formidable obstacle of poverty, most Southern Baptists found 
themselves unable to take part in life beyond the local associations.32 The SBC consisted 
largely of small rural churches with untrained clergy, and that left the practical leadership of 
the Convention to well-educated pastors of the few affluent churches, a practice that 
continued well into the twentieth century. Convinced that northern schools did not provide 
theologically healthy education, Southern Baptists in 1859 launched their first seminary in 
Greenville, South Carolina: Southern Baptist Theological Seminary [Southern Seminary].33 
Many of Southern’s faculty and graduates became an elite educated class, which enjoyed an 
inordinate amount of influence in Convention affairs at the national level.34 Ammerman 
noted that the annual conventions of the SBC became stigmatized as “gentlemanly affairs.” 
Well-to-do messengers at the conventions determined important business matters and learned 
pastors delivered eloquent sermons.35  
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Although Northern Baptists attempted to reunite with the SBC after the Civil War, 
Southern Baptists fought vigorously to protect their regional identity and authority. As part of 
this effort, some Southern Baptists thought it necessary to create their own publication board. 
Since the American Baptist Publication Society had distributed Sunday School lessons and 
materials throughout the duration of the Convention’s life, not all Southern Baptists desired 
to break with tradition. Despite the opposition of many Southern Baptists, however, the SBC 
finally launched its Sunday School Board in 1891. When Northern Baptists criticized this 
decision, the new board received increasingly enthusiastic support from Southern Baptists.36 
The Sunday School Board, in Ammerman’s words, played a significant part in “making the 
Southern Baptist Convention a strong and unified organization with an identity built … on its 
shared use of common materials.”37  
Despite the Convention’s dramatic growth to 13,000 churches and more than one and 
a half million members by the late nineteenth century, its size and organization underwent 
unprecedented changes and challenges during the twentieth century.38 In 1909, Fort Worth, 
Texas, became host to the SBC’s second seminary, Southwestern Baptist Theological 
Seminary [Southwestern Seminary]. Within a decade, the Convention planted its third, New 
Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary [New Orleans Seminary].39 In addition, Southern 
Baptists organized the Executive Committee, a seven-member group that represented the 
many areas of the SBC’s rapidly expanding territory. Enjoying funding from the Cooperative 
Program, a vehicle by which local churches financially supported the SBC, this new 
committee became the fiscal and coordinating capital of the Convention. Headquartered in 
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Nashville, Tennessee, the Executive Committee’s duties included arranging for Convention 
meetings and acting on behalf of the Convention on general business matters, as well as 
fundraising and budgeting for the SBC’s agencies.  By 1925, the Convention comprised an 
astonishing 24,000 churches and 3.6 million members.40  
At this point, Southern Baptist leaders began to question the organization of the SBC 
and its annual conventions.41 First, who had the right to attend conventions? After 
deliberating for several years, they agreed that messengers to the conventions could only be 
from churches, not associations, mission societies, or other organizations. Moreover, each 
church received permission to send at least one messenger, regardless of the church’s size. At 
maximum, a church could send ten messengers.42 Despite the tremendous growth of the 
SBC, a sizeable majority of Southern Baptist laity did not join the decision-making process at 
the annual convention, for lack either of money or desire to participate outside of the local 
association. Second, how much power could messengers yield? Rather than allow thousands 
of messengers in an open session to make decisions that would affect myriad agencies and 
schools, Southern Baptists at the 1931 convention decided to institute boards of trustees. 
These boards, featuring delegates from each state convention, represented a more efficacious 
method of determining policy decisions.43  
Between 1941 and 1961, the SBC grew increasingly less southern and more national 
in its orientation. In 1941, the Convention received a petition from the Southern Baptist 
General Convention of California to join the SBC. Southern Baptists terminated their 
previous agreement with Northern Baptists not to exceed the territorial limits of Texas and 
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formally admitted California into the Convention.44 Shortly after its centennial, the 
Convention formalized its participation with the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs 
[BJCPA] and officially launched its own Christian Life Commission [CLC]; the former 
sought to work towards religious liberty in national and international situations, while the 
latter addressed race relations and family problems. The SBC, in Ammerman’s words, “was, 
for the first time, acting like a national body, placing itself squarely in the midst of the 
problems of the day.”45  
Furthermore, though the Convention had established only three seminaries by its 
hundredth birthday, Southern Baptists doubled this number in the 1950s alone. With 
Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary [Southeastern Seminary] in Wake Forest, North 
Carolina, Golden Gate Baptist Theological Seminary in San Francisco, California, and 
Midwestern Baptist Theological Seminary [Midwestern Seminary] in Kansas City, Missouri, 
the SBC extended its borders from the Sun Belt to the Midwest.46 Within just a few years of 
Midwestern Seminary’s founding, the Convention claimed 32,000 churches and ten million 
members. Indeed, Southern Baptist membership nearly doubled between 1941 and 1961.47 
On the other hand, the decision-making processes of the burgeoning bureaucracy 
were concentrated in the hands of denominational elites. In 1950, Convention leaders set 
forth the following process for electing trustees: first, churches sent messengers to the 
convention; second, church messengers voted to elect a president; third, the elected president 
appointed a Committee on Committees, which in turn nominated a Committee on 
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Nominations and finally, the Committee on Nominations nominated trustees.48 In other 
words, the SBC functioned like a democratic republic in that the amount of influence 
Southern Baptist laity had was contingent not only upon their desire to participate in the 
annual convention but also their ability to afford traveling to the convention to elect a 
president.49    
Given agency heads’ monopoly of Southern Baptist leadership and jurisdiction, they 
informally employed what moderate leader Cecil Sherman later referred to as a “good ‘ole 
boy” system of politics. In essence, those who gave liberally to the Convention vis-à-vis the 
Cooperative Program were more likely to get denominational posts than those who did not. 
“The pastors who loved and supported the SBC plus the [agency heads] plus the editors made 
common cause to put before Southern Baptists the people who … gave themselves to the 
SBC.”50 According to agency head Grady Cothen, those persons who became SBC 
presidents were generally hand-picked by denominational leaders for their leadership in a 
church that gave “generously” to the Convention. In addition, existing leaders often selected 
those whom they knew best to serve as trustees.51 Duke McCall was a patriarch of agency 
heads and a prime example of how the good ‘ole boy system operated. His reputation as an 
exceptional pulpiteer at a wealthy church near Southern Seminary earned him the position of 
New Orleans Seminary’s president. McCall’s presidency there afforded him a highly 
prestigious post as president of the Executive Committee. Further, his services at New 
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Orleans Seminary and the Executive Committee led to his tenure as president of Southern 
Seminary.52  
Agency heads enjoyed relatively untroubled times through the middle of the twentieth 
century. Following World War II, the SBC began to mirror the trend towards urbanization in 
the South. Between 1941 and 1961, the South’s population declined from 63.3 percent rural 
to 41.5 percent rural. Likewise, between 1936 and 1961, the rural constituency of the SBC 
plummeted from 62.1 percent to 32.9 percent. Great numbers of Southern Baptists left for 
work in the cities and became middle-class.53 This meant that more Baptists could afford to 
participate in denominational life beyond the local level. Although many inerrantists became 
prominent pastors of sizeable churches and some even became SBC presidents, these quasi-
outsiders had little representation on denominational agencies. W. A. Criswell, a patriarch of 
inerrantists, duly served as an illustration of agency head politics. Although he held a 
doctorate from Southern Seminary and began preaching at the SBC’s largest church54 in 
1944, Criswell did not receive nomination to serve in any denominational post aside from his 
presidency in the late 1960s.55 Due to their exclusion from SBC affairs, inerrantists remained 
naïve about the process by which agency heads elected trustees until 1961, when the 
controversial book of a seminary professor polarized the Convention.56  
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Chapter Two: Tremors, 1961-1978   
 Having constructed a well-oiled denominational machine with prestigious seminaries 
and sophisticated agencies, agency heads were convinced that all was well. Controversies 
had always existed in the SBC but never threatened its soul. Many Southern Baptists found 
pride and unity in missions, the local autonomy of the church, and shared resources via the 
Sunday School Board. Inerrantists, however, saw things differently. After the Elliott 
Controversy in 1961, Paul Pressler and Ross Edwards organized committees by which they 
could voice their outrage towards agency heads. Inerrantists could not believe that the SBC’s 
publishing press would stamp their seal of approval on a book that directly threatened 
traditional conservative theology.  
The son of the Baptist General Convention of Texas’ executive director, Paige 
Patterson, joined ranks with Pressler in creating a network of likeminded Southern Baptists 
concerned about the direction of the SBC. Following the Broadman Controversy57 in 1970, 
inerrantists interpreted agency heads’ actions as direct attacks on their traditional beliefs. 
Denominational leaders’ willingness to tolerate progressive approaches to Scripture 
convinced inerrantists that their Convention did not represent the interests of its constituents. 
M. O. Owens shared a list of inerrantist contacts with Pressler, created the Baptist Faith and 
Message Fellowship [BFM Fellowship], and launched an unsuccessful campaign to seize the 
North Carolina Baptist Convention [NCBC]. Bill Powell worked with Owens on the BFM 
Fellowship, developed the “ten-year strategy” that would allow inerrantists to reclaim the 
SBC, and used the Southern Baptist Journal [Journal] to catalyze sympathetic Baptists to 
action against the Convention’s leadership. Although Owens and Powell lost what David 
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Morgan called “the first crusade,” Pressler and Patterson stood poised to lead an insurrection. 
The resulting Inerrancy Controversy represented the twenty-year climax of gradually 
building theological tensions in the SBC.  
At almost a hundred years of age, Southern Seminary had already ceased to be a 
source of pride to all parties in the Convention. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, it came 
under fire, accused of heresy. When a Baptist Press article on June 16, 1958, read “13 
Southern Professors Dismissed By Trustees,” many Southern Baptists might not have been 
altogether surprised.58 In response to Southern Seminary President Duke McCall’s balancing 
act to preserve the school’s reputation while allowing professors the liberty to teach as they 
saw fit, thirteen professors accused him of squelching their rights to pursue critical truth. As 
the leader of the SBC’s oldest seminary, McCall faced a precarious predicament.59 How 
could he promote the spirit of progressive research methods without alienating the 
Convention’s core constituency? Accordingly, when professors outspokenly advanced 
ecumenism and the historical criticism of the Bible, in addition to denigrating evangelist 
Billy Graham and revered preacher W. A. Criswell, McCall cautioned them to refrain from 
making remarks that offended grassroots Baptists.60 Since SBC laity helped fund Southern 
Seminary, he stressed, they also possessed the right to ensure that its teachings remained 
within the comfortable confines of theological conservatism.  
Unfortunately, the president’s attempt at a balancing act turned into a tug of war 
between agency heads and moderates. Southern Seminary, according to its former professor 
Ralph Elliott, bred and encouraged the practice of “doublespeak.” In order to avoid ideas that 
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might threaten the beliefs of Baptist readers, students and professors learned to “couch their 
beliefs in acceptable terminology and holy jargon.”61 Ostensibly, McCall encouraged this 
practice in an effort to placate grassroots Baptists and professors.62 For what reason, then, did 
the professors oppose him? When Southern’s Trustees hired McCall in 1951, they did so 
with heavy opposition from the faculty, who desired to hire one of their own. In particular, 
they loathed his status as an agency head and his reputation as theologically conservative.63 
Thus, the thirteen professors’ bold submission of a list of grievances against McCall to a 
committee of Trustees in spring of 1958 was a long time coming.  
Following interviews with the president, ten of the thirteen professors, and several 
other faculty, the committee charged the thirteen with contentious disobedience to the 
president. In retaliation, the thirteen professors took their protest above the committee to the 
Board of Trustees, seeking a more sympathetic ear from higher authorities. The Board of 
Trustees ultimately agreed with the committee, acquitting McCall of all charges and charging 
the thirteen with insubordination. As a result, the professors found themselves promptly 
dismissed from their posts at Southern Seminary.64 Although this fiasco indicated a growing 
conflict between agency heads and moderates, most Southern Baptists interpreted it as “an 
overdue purge of liberal theology.”65  
To the chagrin of inerrantists, agency heads still prized the moderate voice in the 
SBC. In a stroke of irony, Ralph Elliott received an offer to teach at the infant Midwestern 
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Seminary, as did a few of the professors dismissed from Southern.66 Elliott had actually 
begun research for his controversial The Message of Genesis while teaching at Southern. At 
the behest of the Convention’s publishing arm, Broadman Press, he submitted what he felt to 
be a conservative effort to reconcile head and heart. Skirting the dangers of headless religion 
and heartless scholarship, he sought to downplay the historicity (or historical reliability) of 
the first eleven chapters of Genesis in favor of their deeper spiritual message.67 While Elliott 
purportedly upheld the historicity of the patriarchs, he called into question the historical 
existence of Adam and Eve, a literal six-day creation, Noah’s ark, and the Tower of Babel.68 
Regardless of his deliberating over common questions of the time, Elliott’s book signified a 
growing disparity between the Convention and its broad constituency. In his own words, he 
erred only in that he refused to practice doublespeak. In revealing what his contemporaries 
chose to conceal, Elliott made no pretense to believe what laity readers believed.69 Broadman 
Press published his manuscript in July of 1961. 
Within several months of its publication, The Message of Genesis exposed the fault 
lines of the SBC, polarizing agency heads and inerrantists. Elliott’s book elicited immediate 
backlash, pressuring Midwestern Seminary’s Board of Trustees to examine him.70 When they 
decided to uphold Elliott and his teachings, inerrantists grew incensed. By December, the 
book had received notoriety as one of the two most controversial matters of 1961.71 Texas 
pastor K. Owen White published a scathing article in the January 10, 1962, issue of The 
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Baptist Standard and dispersed copies of it to all Baptist state papers. In his article entitled 
“Death in the Pot,” White declared that “the book in question is ‘poison.’ This sort of 
rationalistic criticism can lead only to further confusion, unbelief, deterioration, and 
ultimately disintegration … [it is] liberalism, pure and simple.”72 Amid such virulent 
criticism, the Sunday School Board convened and issued a statement, emphasizing that 
“unanimity of acceptance was not a criteria for publication of a manuscript.”73  
Less than two months after the Sunday School Board issued their statement, a group 
of fifty people gathered in Oklahoma City to discuss what they perceived to be a theological 
crisis in the SBC. Their primary objective was to secure the election of inerrantists to the 
Trustees of Midwestern Seminary.74 At the Oklahoma gathering, keynote speaker W. Ross 
Edwards warned attendees that “the time has arrived for us to plan a strong defense against 
the threat of frigid intellectualism and liberalism which lead to destruction. May we, 
therefore, plan wisely, and well.”75 Following Edwards’ stirring address, the attendees, 
including K. Owen White, determined to appeal to the SBC Committee on Committees that 
inerrantists be placed on the seminary boards.76 Following this decision, they prepared for 
the 1962 San Francisco convention, only a few months away.    
Although, in Shurden’s words, “the messengers arrived in the Bay area expecting a 
showdown” over the “Elliott thing,” agency heads masterfully defused the bomb.77 Before 
the four-day convention convened, no less than five resolutions were presented that pertained 
to Ralph Elliott. SBC President Herschel Hobbs and the Executive Secretary Treasurer of the 
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Executive Committee tactfully called for the appointment of a committee, which would 
present a confessional statement to the 1963 annual convention; the significance of a 
confessional statement lay in its ability for conciliation.78 That agency heads took this 
measure to ensure tranquility suggests that they feared a denominational split if peace 
remained elusive.79 K. Owen White presented two subsequent motions, which the majority 
passed, relating to the Convention’s commitment to biblical inerrancy and opposition to 
ahistorical theological positions in the seminaries.80 In addition, two similar motions were 
made that the Sunday School Board cease publication of Elliott’s book. These motions, 
however, did not receive a majority.81 Ultimately, agency heads did not ban Elliott’s book, 
but they gave inerrantists just enough to feel that their concerns had been taken seriously.  
Immediately following the San Francisco convention, Elliott’s fate seemed 
ambiguous. On the one hand, two approved motions appeared to threaten his teaching post. 
On the other hand, an attempt to recall his book from all sales had failed. Upon subsequent 
deliberations between Elliott, Midwestern Seminary’s administration, and the Board of 
Trustees, the Trustees concluded that Elliott should not republish his book. Elliott refused 
and was dismissed for insubordination. Although agency heads had assuaged inerrantists’ 
desire to see Elliott leave, they did so indirectly. Many inerrantists consequently interpreted 
Elliott’s firing as a victory against theological progressivism.82 Conversely, C. R. Daley of 
Baptist Press proclaimed, “If Elliott is a heretic … he is one of many…. Professors in all our 
seminaries know that Elliott is in the same stream of thinking with most of them, and is more 
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in the center than some of them.”83 Indeed, many professors saw the punishment as a grave 
injustice.84 Given Elliott’s initial favorability with agency heads and his praise from 
moderates, why would agency heads respond as they did? According to historian Samuel S. 
Hill, this controversy “might have been little more than a tempest in a teapot had a university 
or trade house published Elliott’s commentary.”85 Perhaps agency heads made Elliott a 
casualty because he aroused inerrantists’ suspicions that the seminaries employed many other 
professors like him.    
The 1963 Kansas City convention’s adoption of a revised Baptist Faith and Message 
[BFM] statement demonstrated agency heads’ aptitude for compromise. The importance of 
this statement, in Hill’s words, “is that it was produced at all, that a need for it was 
perceived.”86 When the BFM committee presented the revised statement of faith at the 
convention, it contained some rather conspicuous ambiguities. The section entitled 
“Education” read, “there should be a proper balance between academic freedom and 
academic responsibility. Freedom in any orderly relationship of human life is always limited 
and never absolute.”87 Agency heads appeared to be reprimanding moderates. A professor’s 
freedom would not be removed unless they failed to exercise responsibility. This clause 
hinted at what Elliott called the “insidious disease” of double-speak.88 In other words, 
seminary professors could still pursue whatever avenue of research they desired with the 
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exception that they proceed with extreme caution. Doubtless, inerrantist witnesses found 
encouragement in this clause, since it prima facie prohibited Elliott-esque professors from 
earning SBC wages. 
A telling revision appeared in the section entitled “The Scriptures.” Whereas the 1925 
BFM statement spoke of the Scriptures as “a perfect treasure of heavenly instruction” written 
by divinely inspired men, the BFM committee elaborated with the following phrase: “[the 
Bible] is the record of God’s revelation of himself to man.”89 Arguably, these words 
vindicated Elliott’s controversial findings in Genesis. In fact, this very presupposition 
underscored Elliott’s self-professedly conservative approach to the Scriptures; because God’s 
intention for Genesis was to reveal his character to humanity, the historicity of the first 
eleven chapters could be downplayed in favor of its deeper meaning. Another novel clause 
presented itself in the same section: “the criterion by which the Bible is to be interpreted is 
Jesus Christ.” This seemingly cryptic phrase suggested that the committee either favored 
progressive hermeneutics over biblical inerrancy, or explicitly favored doctrinal liberty. 
While the education clause placated inerrantists, the Scriptures clause legitimated progressive 
theology, representing, as James Hefley suggested, a “tip of the hat” to professors.90 
Paradoxically, agency heads solved the Elliott issue by implicitly encouraging doublespeak. 
President Hobbs’ reputation as theologically conservative likely smoothed out any lingering 
tensions at the convention. Thus, the new BFM statement received majority support and the 
Elliott Controversy could be laid to rest.91 
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The flames of controversy did not resurface until 1970, but neither did inerrantists 
slumber. Paul Pressler remained vigilant, acutely aware of the gaping disparity between 
inerrantists, moderates, and agency heads. When word of Elliott’s book reached Paul Pressler 
in 1961, he immediately penned a letter to the president of Midwestern, requesting that 
Elliott be dismissed from his teaching post as due reprisal for his violation of a basic Baptist 
tenet, biblical inerrancy. Pressler also warned that, should the Cooperative Program of the 
SBC continue to fund Midwestern while it employed moderate professors, he would likely 
withdraw his financial support from SBC causes.92 Pressler soon learned that the pastor of 
his church supported The Message of Genesis and even went so far as to send a letter to 
Elliott, apologizing for Pressler’s action, noting that “[he is] a dedicated and zealous young 
Christian … sincerely interested in the work of the LORD.”93 When his pastor called the 
church into a business meeting for the purpose of electing messengers to the upcoming 1962 
convention, Pressler moved that the messengers do everything they could to seek Elliott’s 
dismissal from Midwestern. Even though his motion did not receive majority support, a 
fellow deacon suggested to Pressler that they form a special committee to study the Elliott 
matter. 
Over the next year and a half, the committee interviewed the presidents of many 
Baptist seminaries. Pressler noted that his intentions for the use of the committee clashed 
with others, being that he sought to determine whether Elliott-esque progressivism existed 
outside of Midwestern Seminary. Since he designed his questions to elicit clear answers, as 
Pressler later recalled, his assertiveness tended to embarrass other committee members. As 
the time came in 1964 for the committee to write their reports to the deacons, Pressler did so 
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in addition to circulating five thousand copies of his personal findings to other concerned 
Baptists. Entitled “Report to Second Baptist’s Deacons,” this report contained a key phrase 
that largely mirrored the inerrantist interpretation of biblical inerrancy. After demanding that 
SBC educational institutions uphold the authority of the Bible, Pressler exclaimed,  
If the bedrock of Scripture is eroded away, we have no basis for believing anything. To 
open the door for a minor doctrine which is inconsistent with Scripture today, is to 
open the door for greater variance from Scripture in the future.94 
 
The majority of this fourteen page report dealt extensively with the threat posed by the Elliott 
Controversy. Pressler bolstered his argument with a statement of Billy Graham’s that 
suggested the SBC would falter if the inerrancy of the Bible continued to be rejected.95 He 
also deduced that, regardless of Elliott’s dismissal, moderates could be found in each of the 
SBC’s six seminaries, not to mention other Baptist schools in Texas. To protect the 
reputation of the church, since Pressler included his church’s name in the report he 
circulated, his church leaders eventually fired him and his wife from teaching Sunday 
School.96  
Pressler’s experience serving on the committee did not prove to be in vain, however. 
As a result of the circulation of his report, the development director of New Orleans 
Seminary contacted him about making contributions to the school’s endowment fund. After 
consulting with a few partners, Pressler organized the Evangelical Christian Education 
Foundation [ECEF], a body that would offer finances to colleges and seminaries so long as 
they taught doctrines consistent with traditional conservative theology. New Orleans 
Seminary became the primary recipient of ECEF funds. At some point after the ECEF began 
funding New Orleans Seminary, one of the deacons at Second Baptist referred Pressler to a 
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family-friend, Paige Patterson; Pressler and Patterson apparently shared the same concerns 
and possessed the same drive to effect change in the Convention.97 Thus, in the spring of 
1967 Pressler and his wife came to New Orleans Seminary and met with Patterson and his 
wife. The two couples left the Pattersons’ apartment for coffee and beignets at the Café du 
Monde.98 As they deliberated that night, Pressler and Patterson agreed that a great number of 
Southern Baptists expressed concern about the direction of the Convention, SBC 
ecclesiastical polity could make possible a popular movement designed to ensure a “course 
correction,” and previous attempts to correct the trajectory of the denomination had failed 
due to lack of sufficient resources.99 Consequently, the two covenanted to discover the 
prospects of actually effecting theological renewal in the denomination.100 Patterson later 
related that “we agreed that night that what we would do is make contacts across the 
Convention with those who held our same concerns.… It ended up being a ten-year track.”101 
If the Elliott Controversy failed to illustrate that doctrinal liberty and biblical 
inerrancy could not harmoniously coexist, the Broadman Controversy of 1970 succeeded. 
The idea of the Broadman Bible Commentary had been conceived in 1957 before Elliott’s 
book ever hit the shelves. The Sunday School Board approved it in 1961, giving the editors 
several years in which to work. Volume one of the commentary was finally published in 
October of 1969, featuring an exposition of Genesis by G. Henton Davies and several other 
articles. In his exposition, Davies suggested that, contrary to what Genesis chapter 22 stated, 
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Abraham did not receive the command from God to kill Isaac; rather, he likely experienced a 
psychotic breakdown, which led to the conviction that he should sacrifice his son.102 Like 
Elliott, Davies did not ask questions unfamiliar to seminarian audiences.  
The SBC’s publishing press once again put its stamp of approval on a progressive 
book considered repugnant by inerrantists. Ross Edwards became the first of a handful to 
criticize Davies’ volume, claiming that it was too liberal to grow Southern Baptists 
spiritually. Conversely, editor C.R. Daley posited, “With Dr. Davies and his critics it is the 
same old story of literalism versus nonliteralism.”103 Sunday School Board Executive 
Secretary James Sullivan attempted to deflate the controversy, clarifying that the 
commentary was “designed for those who feel a need for a more thoughtful type of work, 
probing in depth into the truth of God’s word.”104  
By 1970, agency heads could do more to exacerbate than to abate the recurrent 
theological tensions. “We want Southern Baptist [moderates] to know that there is a limit to 
our patience,” Ross Edwards declared at the “Affirming the Bible Conference” held just days 
before the 1970 convention in Denver, Colorado. Frustrated either by inerrantists’ lack of 
retaliation or agency heads’ refusal to anathematize moderates, he complained to a crowd of 
two hundred that a vocal minority had challenged Bible-believing Baptists ever since the 
1962 convention.105 This sentiment was evident in messenger Gwin Turner’s motion at the 
Denver convention that the first volume of the Broadman Bible Commentary be withdrawn 
from publication and rewritten “with due consideration of the [inerrantist] viewpoint.”106 
Sullivan defended the right of Broadman Press to publish books for various segments of 
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Southern Baptists, noting that it did not make endorsements for an official SBC position. To 
no avail, the editor of the Broadman Commentary pled with the messengers to “pass on to the 
next generation a heritage of the open mind and open Bible.” Turner’s motion passed with a 
majority vote.107 
Soon after the Denver convention, William E. Hull, dean of theology at Southern, 
preached a sermon entitled “Shall We Call the Bible Infallible?” which subsequently was 
published in the December 1970 issue of the Executive Committee’s monthly periodical The 
Baptist Program. Hull reasoned that the modern Bible, given its lack of access to extant 
original manuscripts, could not be considered infallible. Even if there did exist a “perfect text 
rendered in a perfect translation,” it would still be subject to the interpretation of fallible 
humans. Therefore, Hull concluded, it would not be wise to claim the Bible as inerrant.108 
Predictably, he received a “filing cabinet of hate mail” and requests that he be fired.109  
With Hull’s sermon becoming the third denominationally-approved publication in a 
decade to undermine traditional conservatism, the Convention’s leadership acted as though 
they were naïve to the theological demographics of their constituency. At the 1971 
convention in St. Louis, M.O. Owens, in objection to Hull’s article, moved that the Executive 
Committee provide equal room in The Baptist Program for the “Convention viewpoint” of 
biblical inerrancy. After deliberating the article, the Executive Committee declared that the 
editors had presented “a balanced response to the article” and concluded that there was no 
need to continue the controversy over The Baptist Program.110 However, other messengers 
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felt frustrated that the 1970 motion had not been followed. The Sunday School Board 
apparently assumed that by getting Davies to revise the commentary, Turner’s motion was 
being followed.111 Consequently, clarification arrived when a slight majority passed a motion 
specifically to “obtain another writer” and proceed according to the 1970 motion.112 The 
Sunday School Board selected Clyde Francisco, an Old Testament professor at Southern 
Seminary. Presumably, inerrantists remained unaware that Francisco had been Ralph Elliott’s 
mentor at Southern and had chided him for not using double-speak in The Message of 
Genesis.113 
 Owens later opined that, had SBC leaders at the 1971 convention given inerrancy a 
fair hearing, the Inerrancy Controversy may have been averted.114 He and Pressler had 
corresponded as early as 1969 for the purpose of building a nationwide fellowship of 
inerrantist Baptists.115 Although Owens’ prior actions consisted largely of correspondence 
with other like-minded inerrantists and the formation of an alliance of 400 pastors who 
desired to effect change in the North Carolina Baptist Convention [NCBC], 1971 marked the 
beginning of his public campaign.116 In order to defeat progressivism in the NCBC, Owens 
organized Baptists United for Spiritual Revival [Baptists United], which even boasted its 
own newspaper, Baptists United News. Baptists United launched an offensive against the 
NCBC, taking issue with Baptist churches’ approval of members who did not receive 
baptism by immersion. Though seemingly trivial to non-Baptists, Owens saw this as a 
distinct threat to Baptist uniqueness. In addition, he clearly saw it as an inherently biblical 
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issue: “we must stop the inroads of [progressivism] here, or not at all.”117 Like Pressler’s 
“Report to Second Baptist’s Deacons,” Owens’s comment implied that questioning “small” 
issues in the Bible now would lead to questioning foundational issues later. An opponent of 
Baptists United accused Owens of turning the issue of Baptist immersion “into a vehicle for 
trying to gain ‘political power’ within the structure of the Baptist State Convention.”118 
Owens’s amendment at the NCBC to decline support from churches who allowed members 
to become baptized by sprinkling received majority support but fell short of the required two-
thirds majority vote.119 
 In 1972, Owens organized the core of what would become the first de facto 
mouthpiece for inerrantists in the SBC. At the 1972 convention, SBC President Carl Bates 
lamented, “If I have learned anything about us during the past two years, it is this: Our 
churches are in trouble!”120 This likely came in response to a messenger’s motion that the 
entire Broadman Commentary be withdrawn from further sale, since it was “out of harmony 
with the spirit and letter of the Baptist Faith and Message.”121 Although the motion failed, 
inerrantists continued to make their dissatisfaction clear to the leadership. Per Owens’s 
request, inerrantists came to Charlotte, North Carolina, following the recent convention, to 
discuss what might be done to prevent the bureaucracy from destroying the Convention. At 
the next meeting, held a few months later at the church of future SBC president Charles 
Stanley, Owens enjoyed the company of twenty-five pastors from eleven states. Bill Powell, 
an employee from the SBC’s Home Mission Board, articulated to those present a ten-year 
strategy that could be implemented to wrest control of the Convention from agency heads. 
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Consequently, the group voted to establish the BFM Fellowship in the following spring.122 
Under Owens’ leadership, the Fellowship determined to swing the SBC back to “the Bible as 
the revealed, infallible, and authoritative Word of God.”123 
 Bill Powell epitomized the power of the pen. The BFM Fellowship, believing a media 
channel for the fellowship to be advantageous to their cause, instituted the Journal in 1973 
under Powell’s direction. Whereas Owens ultimately failed in his efforts to take over the 
NCBC, thereafter limiting his public campaigning activities, Powell continued to take his job 
as editor very seriously. He wrote professors and administrators, ascertaining their beliefs 
about the reliability of the Bible, and published his findings in the Journal. According to 
Hefley, Powell “printed every quotation he could find which he felt showed [moderate] 
influences in the SBC agencies and seminaries.”124 Regardless of Powell’s proclivity for 
“scandal-mongering,”125 the determined editor succeeded in motivating inerrantist activists. 
Indeed, inerrantists used the Journal as a forum for distributing powerful sermons and 
encouraging stories of inerrantist ministries. For those despairing of the progressivism 
propagated by SBC seminaries, inerrantists learned of alternative seminaries that produced 
safe scholarship.126 On a few occasions, Powell even suggested that inerrantists not fund 
inerrancy-rejecting seminaries.127 
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 Possibly the most jarring publication of the Journal was the master’s thesis of Noel 
Wesley Hollyfield Jr. at Southern. The thesis, entitled “A Sociological Analysis of the 
Degrees of ‘Christian Orthodoxy’ Among Selected Students in the Southern Baptist 
Theological Seminary,” revealed that first-year students were much more likely to believe in 
the deity of Jesus and the certainty of life after death than were students in their final year. In 
other words, Hollyfield discovered that “as higher education increased, orthodoxy 
decreased.128 Without doubt, many inerrantists then felt the reverberation of Powell’s cry in 
1976 to “elect trustees who will fire the Bible-doubting teachers and hire teachers who do 
believe that the Bible is the verbally inspired and inerrant Word of God.”129 
By the mid to late 1970s, some moderates and agency heads appeared well aware of 
the threat inerrantists posed. The BFM Fellowship at that point had either developed 
relationships or shared the same theology with renowned super church pastors such as Homer 
Lindsay Jr., Jerry Vines, Adrian Rogers, and W.A. Criswell; each of these preachers carried 
with them an undisputed influence over large numbers of Southern Baptists.130 In 1976, C. R. 
Daley cautioned moderates and agency heads that Rogers, pastor of Bellevue Baptist Church 
in Memphis, Tennessee, represented “the most brilliant of this [inerrantist] group.” In 
addition to pastoring the second largest church in the Convention, he shared the same 
inerrantist views as Paige Patterson, his former classmate at New Orleans Seminary. Fearing 
that Rogers might be elected as president of the SBC in 1976, Daley and several other editors 
wrote editorials that promoted the former Executive Secretary of the Sunday School Board, 
James Sullivan. With this impressive support, Sullivan was elected. 
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 When Sullivan decided not to run for a second term in 1977, agency head Jimmy 
Allen broke standard protocol by engaging in a quasi-campaign effort against Rogers. 
Perhaps the appearance of Rogers’ name on the list of those to speak at the Pastors’ 
Conference made Allen nervous. Rogers withheld his name from consideration for SBC 
president, however, and Allen defeated candidate Jerry Vines.131 With fiery sermons from 
both Criswell and Rogers at the Pastors’ Conference denouncing the pervasiveness of 
progressivism in the Convention, inerrantists made no less of a showing.132 Moreover, one 
messenger boldly moved that the Bible be respected as the inspired Word of God and “that 
its teachings be accepted as their criteria and defining lines by which educational policy, 
conduct codes, and administration decisions affecting the institution and its witness will be 
formed.”133 An agency head at the convention noted in his memoir that every convention 
since 1959 witnessed the “semantic debate about the inspiration of Scriptures.”134 
This bureaucratic use of politicking proved to be only a slight hiccup for the growing 
inerrantist entourage. Pressler had known and corresponded with both Owens and Powell 
since the 1960s. By 1977, however, the time came for an intentional planning meeting in 
Atlanta.135 At least one inerrantist pastor from every major state convention came to this 
meeting, where they discussed the rerouting of the Convention.136 By persuading enough 
messengers to attend a convention and elect an inerrantist president, as long as the president 
appointed inerrantists to the Committee on Committees, they could begin to effect change in 
the Convention. Moreover, within six years of proper appointments, inerrantists would gain 
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ascendancy on the boards.137 Since a 1977 issue of the Journal notified inerrantists that an 
International Council on Biblical Inerrancy had been formed, this likely factored into their 
deliberations as well. Given that the Council’s founders included W.A. Criswell, Paige 
Patterson, and Robert Preus, inerrantists likely would have learned in specific detail how 
Preus’s brother had wrested control of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod [LCMS] from 
non-inerrantists.138 Attendees at this meeting decided not to launch their campaign until 1979 
both to respect the customary two-year presidency and to allow time to gain more followers 
and resources. Patterson and Pressler would hold the next meeting in the fall of 1978.  
The LCMS schism in many ways foreshadowed the Inerrancy Controversy. Like the 
Convention’s seminaries, the Synod’s Concordia Seminary in St. Louis, Missouri, had 
developed a reputation for producing theology widely out of sync with grassroots 
inerrantists. Indeed, Concordia came under heavy criticism in the 1960s for some of its 
professors’ progressive views. Even Concordia Seminary President John Tietjen outspokenly 
espoused his reliance upon historical critical methods of interpreting the Bible. Elliott had 
actually maintained frequent correspondence with one of Concordia’s professors throughout 
the Elliott Controversy, until he received the following message from him: “Ralph, you 
won’t be hearing from me anymore; it isn’t safe to be in conversation.”139 When Jacob Preus 
became president of the LCMS in 1969, he sought to eradicate the progressivism his 
constituents loathed, promising to return the Synod to “the proper understanding of and 
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adherence to the doctrine of inspiration and inerrancy of Scripture.”140 One of his primary 
goals was to remove Tietjen from his post. In 1973, Preus convinced the church to condemn 
the theological positions of Concordia’s president in addition to forty-five of its fifty faculty 
members. 1974 then saw the suspension of Tietjen and the subsequent mass flight of students 
and faculty. Roughly 80 percent of the 400 students and forty-five faculty left Concordia to 
establish their own seminary, which they called Seminex (Seminary in Exile).141 
The events of the 1978 convention, in Sutton’s words, served as a foretaste of the 
pivotal 1979 convention. The Pastors’ Conference featured Criswell and James Robison. As 
he had the previous year, Criswell emphasized the unequivocal inerrancy of the Bible, 
declaring, “This Word [the Bible] that we hold in our hand is but a copy of the perfect and 
fixed, and unchanging Word of God [Jesus] in Heaven … kept inviolate and inerrant by the 
sovereign God.”142 Robison continued, “All true Southern Baptists believe the Bible is the 
infallible, inspired, inerrant Word of the Holy God … [those who doubt this] are more deadly 
than cancer and more hideous than snakes.”143 In addition, representing one more attempt in 
a pattern of such attempts dating back to 1959, a messenger moved that the Convention adopt 
a clear SBC affirmation of biblical inerrancy. Specifically, he proposed that the Bible be 
specified as “the infallible, inerrant, verbally inspired Word of God as recorded in its original 
manuscripts.”144 In response, President Reelect Jimmy Allen cautioned that “the basic 
position of Baptists is a middle-of-the-road belief in the infallibility of the Bible,” and the 
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motion failed.145 His statement only bought a little more time for agency heads to hold sway 
over the Convention.  
In the fall of 1978, the Atlanta Airport Ramada Inn hosted an anonymous crowd of 
inerrantists who would set the SBC ablaze with controversy over the course of the next 
decade. Patterson identified the attendees of this epic meeting as a coterie of pastors and laity 
who had organized themselves in retaliation to the Convention’s perceived drift from 
orthodoxy and evangelism. To preserve Southern Baptists from the fate of American 
Baptists, British Baptists, and United Methodists, inerrantist attendees finally elected to take 
large-scale political action.146 Specifically, they determined to raise awareness among 
Southern Baptists in each state to the dangers of the Convention and its progressive 
seminaries. Participants in the Atlanta meeting would attempt to secure commitments from 
Southern Baptists to attend the annual convention in 1979 for the express purpose of electing 
an inerrantist as president of the SBC. In exchange, Patterson and Pressler agreed to draw 
public scrutiny towards themselves, allowing other inerrantists to remain anonymous.147 
They determined to use biblical inerrancy as their platform. 
 This, Patterson later mused, signified the most strategic choice made by inerrantists. 
Since most Southern Baptists believed the Bible to be inerrant and, consequently, issues such 
as the resurrection of Christ, abortion, and the sanctity of marriage resolved themselves in 
that presupposition, moderates and agency heads would ultimately be forced to argue with 
the Bible.148 It became crucial then for the inerrantist movement to nominate only candidates 
who endorsed biblical inerrancy and agreed to comply with their plan. The Atlanta group 
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decided upon Adrian Rogers as their first inerrantist candidate for president.149 In order to 
protect him, however, Patterson and Pressler kept Rogers at arm’s length. If it became known 
that he enjoyed any sort of affiliation with Patterson and Pressler, his chances of election 
might lessen dramatically.150 Having a concrete strategy, a presidential candidate, and a 
growing entourage, inerrantists could now execute a revolutionary effort to seize the 
Convention.  
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Chapter Three: Schism, 1979-1990 
The theological tremors of 1961 to 1978 produced a full-blown political schism in the 
SBC. Inerrantists procured substantial resources, devised an astute campaign, and influenced 
record numbers of Southern Baptist messengers to attend the annual conventions. In short, 
inerrantists were well prepared to reroute the course of the Convention. Conversely, 
moderates experienced a sluggish start to their counter-campaign. Even though Cecil 
Sherman and his Gatlinburg group challenged inerrantists’ climb to power as early as 1981, 
moderates would not become fully united until 1984. By the time that several agency heads 
joined the moderate coalition, inerrantists had already won six consecutive presidencies. 
Moderates and agency heads simply could not agree what to do about the inerrantist crisis. 
Although the results of the presidential elections at the 1985 and 1986 conventions signified 
that moderates were gaining traction in their struggle with inerrantists, agency heads cut the 
heart out of the moderate movement with their ill-fated peace proposals, the Peace 
Committee in 1985 and the Glorieta Statement in 1986.  
Moderates continued to challenge inerrantists until the New Orleans convention in 
1990, but in vain. That it took the highly organized inerrantist movement over ten years to 
secure the Convention and that moderates fell short in their efforts to repel them revealed that 
the SBC’s power lay in the hands of neither party. Since agency heads’ instincts were largely 
to protect the Convention via compromise and inerrantists’ aspiration was to seize the 
Convention without compromise, moderates were doomed from the start. Agency heads’ and 
moderates’ love for doctrinal democracy collided violently with inerrantists’ desire for 
theological autocracy, causing a political revolution for the soul of the SBC.   
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 When the inerrantist campaign first drew the critical eye of the media in the early 
summer of 1980, Pressler’s and Patterson’s strategy seemed well underway. Although the list 
of those appointed to speak at the 1979 Pastors’ Conference, featuring several prominent 
inerrantists, had been published by the Christian Index in February, it failed to evoke anxiety 
among moderates and agency heads.151 By May 9th, slightly over a month before the Houston 
convention, the Baptist Press caught wind that “meetings have been held in at least 15 states 
in recent months to encourage messengers to attend the … convention in Houston … to elect 
a president committed to biblical inerrancy.”152 Baptist Press’s Toby Druin further revealed 
that Patterson admitted to encouraging and attending many of these meetings. In keeping 
with the inerrantist strategy, Patterson protected Rogers by mentioning Jerry Vines, Bailey 
Smith, and a handful of others as great prospective inerrantist presidents. He offhandedly 
mentioned that Rogers might be “draftable.” Both Vines and Smith, presumably in on the 
1978 Atlanta meeting, implied to Baptist Standard that they would consider the 
presidency.153  
Moreover, a May 24th issue of the Christian Index confirmed that Harold Lindsell, 
president of the inerrantist BFM Fellowship, intended to campaign in several cities across the 
nation before the 1979 convention in mid-June. When interviewed, he declared that “it [was] 
time for Southern Baptists to face the issue of inerrancy even if it meant the loss of 500,000 
members.”154 Lindsell also happened to be promoting his recent book, The Bible in the 
Balance, which identified the current battles of biblical inerrancy to be a watershed for the 
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future of orthodoxy. In a chapter on the SBC, he republished Hollyfield’s controversial 
thesis, which indicated a “decline in orthodoxy as students progressed through studies there 
[at Southern Seminary].”155 By noting that Southern Baptists felt it was necessary to organize 
and fund inerrantist institutions like Criswell College and Mid-America Baptist Seminary, 
Lindsell argued that the SBC had failed to give its students a healthy education.156 In 
essence, he posed the question to Southern Baptists and other evangelical readers: “Will you 
stand under the authority of Scripture or will you stand in judgment over Scripture?”157 By 
denying his involvement with Patterson and Pressler, in addition to simplifying and 
polarizing the issue of biblical inerrancy, Lindsell implicitly encouraged grassroots Baptists 
to vote for Rogers in the upcoming election.  
 If not before, the Pastors’ Conference surely morphed into an inerrantist pep rally by 
1979.158 Rogers turned up the heat with a bold declaration that the devil hated the books of 
Genesis and Revelation and preferred that believers view them respectively as myth and 
mystery.159 He then proceeded to denounce the Baptist media for supporting the progressive 
seminaries and agencies of the SBC. Following Rogers’ sermon, W.A. Criswell proclaimed, 
“We will have a great time here, if for no other reason than to elect Adrian Rogers as 
president of the Southern Baptist Convention.” Although it elicited a roaring applause, this 
endorsement broke protocol; never before had a former SBC president openly endorsed a 
candidate.160 Furthermore, Criswell’s distinction of pastoring the Convention’s largest 
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church gave his endorsement extra weight.161 James Robison followed suit, denigrating 
moderates and agency heads as devils and endorsing “a president who is totally committed to 
the removal from this denomination any teacher, any educator, who does not believe that the 
Bible is the inerrant, infallible word of the living God.” He went further and accused agency 
heads of being “worse than cancer” for allowing progressivism to erode the foundation of the 
SBC.162  
The 1979 convention dumbfounded moderates and agency heads and foreshadowed 
the vitriol and contention that would characterize the next eleven consecutive conventions. 
On the convention’s opening day, outgoing President Jimmy Allen remarked that “good and 
sincere people” were pressing the Convention to alter its noble focus from missions and 
evangelism, and urged messengers to resist division over doctrine.163 Rogers was one of six 
candidates on the ballot, including agency heads Robert Naylor and Porter Routh. Routh, as 
Executive Secretary Treasurer of the Executive Committee, was the highest-ranking 
administrator in the SBC.164 Understandably, moderates and agency heads were astounded 
when Rogers received an unprecedented 51.4 percent vote on the first ballot; a first-ballot 
presidential election in the SBC was rare to say the least.165 Not only had the inerrantist 
movement organized a successful campaign, but their candidate took over half the vote on a 
ballot with five other candidates. Unfortunately for inerrantists, many messengers left the 
convention immediately after Rogers assumed the presidency.166 Thus, an inerrantist’s later 
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motion that doctrinal positions of SBC officials be ascertained did not receive enough 
support to pass.  
When messenger Larry Lewis presented a resolution that would require all SBC 
agencies to employ only teachers who believed in the inerrancy of the Bible, agency head 
Wayne Dehoney tactfully proposed that messengers reaffirm the 1963 BFM statement. After 
President Rogers conferred privately with Dehoney, this motion received support from Lewis 
and agency head Herschel Hobbs. Consequently, messengers voted overwhelmingly in 
support of it.167  Most importantly, Dehoney submitted a resolution decrying political activity 
in the SBC. Following a messenger’s accusation that Dehoney himself had engaged in overt 
political activity during past conventions and Pressler’s self-defense that he had done nothing 
wrong in encouraging more participation of laity in the convention, outgoing President Allen 
said he was “grieved by the spirit that is now moving in this room.” Routh acknowledged his 
disappointment that Southern Baptists would resort to secular politics and the resolution 
subsequently passed: “Be it therefore Resolved, that this Convention go on record as 
disavowing overt political activity and organization as a method of selection of its 
officers.”168 In a post-convention interview, President Rogers declared his unequivocal 
commitment to biblical inerrancy and denied any involvement with Pressler and Patterson.169 
The inerrantist strategy was working.170 
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After the Houston convention, agency heads had varied reactions. Many agreed to 
allow Rogers the customary two-year presidency, doubting inerrantists’ ability to make any 
significant changes. Others either assumed that this sudden shift of behavior would gradually 
taper off or that discerning Baptists would see through the smokescreen of biblical 
inerrancy.171 The Sunday School Board’s President Grady Cothen later mused that “no one 
was aware that this was the beginning of a major [inerrantist] movement.”172 One agency 
head likely spoke for many when he deduced that inerrantists would be unable to bring a 
substantial number of supporters to the 1981 convention in Los Angeles since “institutional 
people are on expense accounts and will be there in force.”173 Agency heads felt sure they 
could handily repossess the SBC presidency by 1981. Presuming that inerrantists would not 
challenge them in 1982, agency heads would again have home-field advantage at the 1983 
Pittsburgh convention. In other words, whatever damage President Rogers did in two years 
would be reversed by agency heads in the next four.  
Inerrantists, aware of the prospective difficulty in securing consecutive presidential 
victories, deftly crafted a strategy that would put agency heads at a major disadvantage. In 
order to keep the momentum in inerrantists’ favor, President Rogers needed to appoint 
inerrantists to the Committee on Committees. By doing so, inerrantists would move one step 
closer to effecting change in the Convention’s plethora of agencies. According to a later 
statement by Pressler, the inerrantist president appointed an “absolutely superb” Committee 
on Committees.174 However, what would inerrantists do to raise the monetary support 
necessary to elect a president for the 1981 convention?  
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President Rogers’ public announcement in May of 1980 that he did not wish to be 
reelected, just one month before the St. Louis convention, suggests that inerrantists had made 
preparations in advance. By waiting so late to withdraw his name from consideration for the 
election he would surely have won without opposition, given the customary reelection, 
outgoing President Rogers stunned agency heads. They had only a month if they wished to 
defeat the next inerrantist nominee. Moreover, if inerrantists won this election, they might 
well possess the presidency for an extra two years. Since inerrantists boasted an abundance 
of support in St. Louis and New Orleans, the location of the 1982 convention, the election of 
an inerrantist in 1980 might help ensure that they remained in power until at least 1984. 
Patterson admitted in a May interview with Baptist Standard that the LCMS’s own 
Concordia Seminary would offer rooms for grassroots Baptists who pledged to elect an 
inerrantist candidate.175 Consequently, Rogers afforded inerrantists five years of power if 
unopposed for the customary two year runs.176   
The St. Louis convention in 1980 revealed two things: agency heads would 
experience an uphill struggle in maintaining order and inerrantists were well organized. Key 
moderate leader Cecil Sherman recalled that he and his wife felt out of place at the 1980 
convention. Having missed the pivotal Houston election, he was surprised to find himself at 
what seemed to be “more like a political convention than a religious gathering.”177 Rumors 
surfaced at the convention that agency heads nominated candidate Richard Jackson, a self-
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professed inerrantist, to head off inerrantist candidate Bailey Smith.178 In an election 
remarkably reminiscent of the previous year, Smith received 51.67 percent of the vote, easily 
routing the five other candidates.179 Like former President Rogers, he also pastored a large 
church and had gained exposure at the Pastors’ Conference.180 Perhaps having learned from 
their mistake the previous year, enough messengers remained present after Smith’s election 
to adopt a resolution that, in Shurden’s words, foretold much of what would happen in the 
next decade.181 
Resolution sixteen read like an inerrantist manifesto, exhorting trustees of seminaries 
and other SBC-affiliated agencies to ensure the employment of only “faculty members and 
professional staff who believe in the divine inspiration of the Bible, infallibility of the 
original manuscripts, and that the Bible is truth without any error.”182 Thus, the motion that 
agency heads derailed in 1979 came back with a vengeance in 1980. When agency head 
Hobbs asked for the resolution to be softened, his amendment failed to garner majority 
support.183 According to Hefley, this signified “that the time had passed when a 
denominational ‘statesman’ … could bend the Convention his way on the Bible.”184 Like his 
predecessor, President Smith declared in a post-convention interview that he supported 
biblical inerrancy but took no part in the political schemes of Pressler and Patterson.185 
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Inerrantist rhetoric reached an alarming new pitch in September of 1980, when 
Pressler uttered unfortunate words that would further polarize the Convention. A couple of 
months after the St. Louis convention, he and Patterson attended a conference at Old Forest 
Road Baptist Church in Lynchburg, Virginia. When invited to speak, Pressler outlined the 
key to inerrantists’ campaign: “The lifeblood of the Southern Baptist Convention is the 
trustees. We need to go for the jugular–we need to go for the trustees.”186 Rather than keep 
trustees that “sit there like a bunch of dummies and rubber stamp everything that’s presented 
to them,” inerrantists would appoint trustees who prized biblical inerrancy. Although 
Patterson had informed the media back in April of inerrantists’ intent to secure the trustees, 
even spelling out this plan in resolution sixteen, Pressler’s “violent” language immediately 
made headlines in several Baptist news agencies.187 The jugular report was shortly covered 
by virtually every Baptist paper from Virginia to California. However, while inerrantists 
received much denigration for wickedly bringing “hardball politics into the Convention,”188 
Baptist editors largely agreed that the strategy would never work. 
After the 1980 convention, Southern Seminary President Duke McCall encouraged 
Cecil Sherman to organize a resistance. If inerrantists had not appeared to be a threat before, 
Pressler’s speech convinced them otherwise. Thus, Sherman sent letters to twenty-five 
pastors and invited them to a meeting at the Holiday Inn in Gatlinburg, Tennessee. Within 
two weeks of the jugular speech, sixteen of the twenty-five arrived in Gatlinburg to 
determine what sort of response they should give to inerrantists.189 Sherman defined these 
men as “products of the denominational educational system” who cheerfully helped to fund 
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the denomination. They did not agree with inerrantists that the SBC had drifted into 
progressivism and suspected that inerrantists would endanger the Convention.190 Therefore, 
Sherman’s group of moderates sketched a list of potential allies and agreed to choose a 
candidate to oppose Bailey Smith’s reelection in 1981. They concluded that in order to save 
their Convention from falling into inerrantists’ hands, they too must commit themselves “to 
do Baptist politics.” In an interview with Baptist Press after the Gatlinburg meeting, 
Sherman claimed that the real issue in the SBC was “not theology or the Bible,” but an overt 
power grab.191  
If agency heads possessed the same sense of urgency as did Sherman’s group, they 
certainly responded differently. In October, the Executive Committee met and debated at 
length how it should react to resolution sixteen, ultimately concluding that “though the 
resolution of doctrinal integrity was not referred to the Executive Committee by the SBC, the 
Committee acknowledges the resolution as adopted by the Convention.” That statement 
continued, “and [the Executive Committee] assures the Convention that the professional staff 
of the Executive Committee over the years has accepted the Baptist Faith and Message as 
adopted in 1963.”192 This suggested two things: First, the Executive Committee held the 
power to refute the resolution, even while it garnered enough of a vote to pass. Moreover, 
they did not strike down the resolution out of fear that inerrantists’ accusations that agency 
heads did not represent the interests of grassroots Baptists may have been vindicated. 
Second, they apparently felt the need to defend themselves doctrinally to the Convention. 
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With less than two years in power, inerrantists proved themselves already able to put 
pressure on the denominational leadership.  
In January, Walter Shurden delivered a weighty address to the agency heads. Alarmed 
by the jugular speech, he warned them that Pressler was “one of the first persons in the 
history of the Southern Baptist Convention to know what the jugular of the Convention is.” 
As such, Pressler and his allies would not stop until their “well-funded political party” 
obtained authority over all the Convention’s institutions.193 Shurden’s plea fell on deaf ears, 
for President Smith soon delivered a statement that defused tensions in the Convention. 
Claiming that he would do his best to bring harmony and peace to the SBC, the president’s 
conciliatory manner assuaged the concerns of the Executive Committee and other agency 
heads.194 Specifically, President Smith promised to appoint a Committee on Committees that 
represented “all kinds of Baptists.” Moderate Jim Slatton, after conversing with a few agency 
heads, was expressly forbidden to oppose the incumbent president, since he would be 
“invincible” at the 1981 convention.195 Since Sherman’s group wanted to thwart Pressler’s 
and Patterson’s agenda more than they wanted to beat President Smith, they decided to lie 
low until April.196 When the president’s appointments became public in April, Sherman’s 
group called his bluff and chose Baylor University’s President Abner McCall as their first 
candidate.197 
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The Los Angeles convention in 1981 illustrated the depth of discord between agency 
heads and moderates. Sherman’s group arrived expecting to lose. They simply desired to 
make a statement by attaining 4,500 votes, enough to show inerrantists that their efforts 
would not continue unopposed. To their shock, Sherman’s group realized that even their 
opposition would not go unopposed. Prior to the start of the convention, Porter Routh found 
Sherman and reprimanded him. “You people need to stand down. We have one troublesome 
group stirring the water, and now you people have formed another. We can take care of these 
people. We don’t need your help.” Shortly thereafter, another member of the Executive 
Committee sought him out and relayed the same warning, noting that Sherman’s group 
would fail miserably and make fools of themselves if they followed through with their 
nomination of Abner McCall.198 
Ultimately, the moderates’ candidate received 39 percent of the vote compared to the 
60 percent acquired by incumbent President Smith. However, they succeeded in attaining 
their goal of 4,500 votes and certainly made a statement, prompting one moderate to say 
“I’ve never lost in such great numbers before.”199 Indeed, moderates proved to agency heads 
that they could organize. However, President Smith and other inerrantists at the convention 
muted the perceived necessity of a counter offensive with their pious language. They spoke 
so convincingly of good intentions and their desire for inclusivity in the Convention that 
agency heads decided to “get the controversy behind them and get on with the work of the 
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Convention.”200 This likely explains why a proposal to dilute the president’s appointive 
power failed.201  
The aftermath of the Los Angeles convention did not bode well for the mobilization 
of a united opposition. When Sherman accused the Executive Committee of helping get 
President Smith reelected, he received a letter from the Executive Committee’s chair, saying 
“His reelection was in the best interest of the SBC. He is not anti-denomination nor in the 
pocket of any particular group.”202 This statement likely revealed the success of President 
Smith in distancing himself from Pressler and Patterson. The president convinced agency 
heads that he had no stake in the Inerrancy Controversy; rather, he felt that God placed him 
in his position of authority for the healing of the Convention. With one month remaining 
before the 1982 convention in New Orleans, President Smith claimed in an interview with 
Baptist Standard that his greatest contribution in the past two years was the “new peace” in 
the SBC. He even went so far as to say that he did not take offense at moderates’ opposition 
to his reelection. His “language of Zion,” as Sherman called it, obfuscated moderates’ 
decision whether or not to run a candidate in New Orleans. With just a month to campaign, 
Sherman’s group finally found a candidate willing to oppose inerrantists, Southern 
Seminary’s retiring President Duke McCall.203  
At the New Orleans convention in 1982, inerrantists played their part so well that 
they created a temporary peace. Seeing how receptive agency heads were to President 
Smith’s language of Zion, inerrantists nominated James Draper for the presidency. Draper 
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had a broad appeal as a prima facie centrist and had already gained a favorable hearing 
among grassroots Baptists in previous Pastors’ Conferences. His church even gave strong 
monetary support to the Convention, likely increasing his favorability among agency heads. 
Perhaps due to agency heads’ assumption that the Convention was returning to its traditional 
election procedures, two candidates were nominated in addition to inerrantist Draper and 
moderate McCall.204 On the first ballot, Draper received 8,081 votes to McCall’s 6,124. 
Since the other two candidates accrued a combined 3,000 votes, Draper and McCall entered a 
runoff. Draper won with 57 percent of the vote, leaving McCall 43 percent.205 In a post-
annual conference, President Draper denied any affiliation with Pressler and Patterson, and 
gave assurances that his presidency would be one of “healing and bringing [Southern 
Baptists] together.”206  
President Draper’s attempts to bring Southern Baptists together for discussion had the 
effect of removing Sherman’s group from political action for two years. The new president 
was considered by many to be less partisan than his two inerrantist predecessors.207 Despite 
having voted for McCall against Draper, Cothen recalled, “[President Draper] debunked the 
idea that he and I were adversaries,” when he addressed the Trustees of the Sunday School 
Board in August.208 President Draper also bolstered his centrist appeal by calling for an SBC 
Leadership Discussion Meeting in late 1982, drawing leaders from virtually every arena of 
Southern Baptist life, including Sherman. President Draper made a painstaking effort to 
assuage the fears of moderates and agency heads, gently contending that inerrantists simply 
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desired parity in the Convention. The seminaries presented a case in point for his argument; 
inerrantists comprised an unquestionable minority of SBC-employed professors. Even 
Sherman admitted that the new president said things “that any fair person could not reject.” 
When Sherman and his group gathered together in May of 1983, they voted 19 to 6 not to 
oppose President Draper’s reelection. Given his reputation as a peacemaker, it would be 
“impossible to mount a campaign to defeat him in Pittsburgh.”209 
However, once the incumbent president was reelected without opposition at the 1983 
convention, the ostensible surrender of Sherman’s group drew the scorn of Christian Life 
Commission director Foy Valentine. He and a handful of other agency heads judged 
Sherman’s group to be ineffective and thought that a different approach might work better. In 
effect, Valentine told Sherman not to bother gearing up for the Kansas City convention in 
1984 because he and a few allies already had a plan to win.210 The Pittsburgh convention 
signified the only unopposed reelection during the entire Inerrancy Controversy. More 
importantly, it culminated a series of elections that had afforded inerrantists five whole years 
in power. By March of 1984, Pressler could comfortably say, “the direction of the 
Convention is irrevocably set. I do not think there will be any reversing of the direction that 
is now set.”211 
The results of the 1984 convention indefinitely ensured that whatever resources and 
organization moderates mustered in their opposition to inerrantists’ ascendancy, it would be 
too little, too late. Valentine and his group arrived with their candidate, Grady Cothen, who 
had recently retired from his post as president of the Sunday School Board. Complicating 
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matters, Cothen had to face off against John Sullivan and inerrantist candidate Charles 
Stanley, a prominent televangelist.212 While Cothen earned a reputable standing as a 
denominational statesman who had served in several posts, Sullivan appeared to many as a 
“middle-of-the-road candidate.”213 Regardless of their respective attractiveness to voters, the 
two gained a combined 48 percent to Stanley’s 52 percent.214 Further disquieting moderates 
and agency heads, the Committee on Nominations nominated Paul Pressler to a position on 
the Executive Committee. Although Winfred Moore moved that Pressler be replaced with 
another candidate, the inerrantist was allowed to assume his new post.215 In the manner of his 
immediate predecessors, President Stanley denied his involvement with Pressler and 
Patterson.216 Patterson later noted that “coming off the victory in Kansas City we had more 
confidence than ever before.”217 With inerrantists’ sixth consecutive victory, the Kansas City 
convention, in Shurden’s words, was the “momentum swing … that pushed [inerrantists] to 
eventual victory.”218 
Between the Kansas City convention and the subsequent convention in Dallas, the 
birth of a vocal formalized coalition of moderates precipitated escalated vitriol in the 
Inerrancy Controversy. In the wake of Stanley’s election, Southwestern Seminary’s President 
Russell Dilday and Duke McCall’s successor at Southern, President Roy Honeycutt, 
deliberated with other seminary presidents about what actions they might take, ultimately 
deciding to enlist the support of Sherman and his group to work together as a unified front. 
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They determined to meet in October. Meanwhile, Presidents Dilday and Honeycutt began to 
vocally denounce inerrantists. Southwestern’s president led the charge, criticizing Pressler’s 
and Patterson’s faction as a powerful machine that sought violently to replace the “spirit of 
Southern Baptist cooperation” with “the spirit of independent fundamentalism.”219 In a fall 
convocation on the campus of Southern Seminary, President Honeycutt declared 
unambiguously that “’unholy forces’ are now at work—which, if left unchecked, will destroy 
essential qualities of both our Convention and this seminary.” Reacting to inerrantists’ recent 
efforts to gather intelligence concerning the theological positions of seminary presidents and 
professors, he declared “holy war.”220 
President Honeycutt’s remarks soon drew a torrent of inerrantist criticism, 
particularly from SBC President Stanley, W.A. Criswell, and Patterson. Criswell and 
President Stanley demanded that he resign. Patterson decried the Southern president’s 
comments and challenged him to a public debate.221 On the heels of the escalating tensions in 
the Convention, moderates gathered at the Atlanta Hartsfield Airport and came together for 
the first time as a united front of moderates. Immediately, they chose president of the Baptist 
General Convention of Texas Winfred Moore as their candidate to oppose President 
Stanley’s reelection, and began campaigning. Moderates had roughly eight months to prepare 
for the battle at the Dallas convention in 1985. Taking into consideration the average 
convention of 30,000, they concluded that 16,000 votes would afford them a victory.222  
The “shootout in Dallas,” as it would soon be called, likely stood out as the most 
pivotal convention in the Inerrancy Controversy. Itching for a seventh successive victory, 
                                                        
219 Cothen, Memoir, 187. 
220 Roy L. Honeycutt, Jr., “To Your Tents O Israel,” in Shurden, Going, 124, 132-3.  
221 Leonard, 141; Cothen, Memoir, 190. 
222 Sherman, 172-3. 
 61 
Patterson and former President Draper warned grassroots Baptists that the Convention would 
be in danger if Stanley was not reelected.223 Criswell sent letters to thousands of ministers in 
the SBC, urging them to reelect “God’s prophet” at the Dallas convention.224 Vocal 
opposition from the seminary presidents and recently from the president of the Foreign 
Mission Board, according to Hefley, backfired by inspiring thousands of grassroots Baptists 
to come to the 1985 convention in support of President Stanley’s reelection. An 
unprecedented 45,000 messengers registered for the 1985 convention, the largest convention 
gathering in Southern Baptist history.225 This nearly doubled the record number of 
messengers at a convention before the Inerrancy Controversy.226 Moderate candidate Moore 
presented a real challenge to inerrantists. His “impeccable conservative credentials,” in 
Leonard’s words, undermined inerrantists’ representation of moderates as the “liberal fringe” 
of the Convention.227  
On the other hand, Baptists who watched the Dallas Morning News on election day 
learned that Billy Graham relayed the following message to Stanley via an associate: “Tell 
[President Stanley] that I will be praying for him, during the Southern Baptist Convention in 
Dallas. Tell him that if I could be there I would vote for him.”228 An endorsement from the 
typically non-partisan Graham, held in high regard by countless Southern Baptists, did not 
bode well for moderates. Whatever the extent that the renowned evangelist’s prayer played 
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into the election, President Stanley proceeded to garner 55.3 percent of the vote, leaving 
Moore with only 44.7.229 Though moderates lost the election, they surpassed their goal of 
16,000 votes by 4,000; taking the 1982 and 1984 conventions into consideration, however, 
this did not resemble much progress.230 In a conciliatory gesture, Stanley offered Moore the 
vice-presidency. Observer Nancy Ammerman wrote that messengers passionately applauded, 
sensing “a potential reconciliation in the air.”231 Moderates and inerrantists knew better; the 
vice-president was little more than a figurehead.232  
In the midst of “holy war,” a proposal for peace tugged at the heart strings of 
messengers, agency heads, inerrantists, and moderates alike.233 Agency heads Frank Paschall 
and Charles Pickering had initiated separate efforts to make peace between moderates and 
inerrantists. Shortly before the convention, Pickering consulted with several state Baptist 
presidents and determined to establish a Peace Committee, whose twenty members would be 
elected at the Dallas convention.234 With the blessing of the president, vice-president, 
Criswell, and Paschall, this committee, comprising leaders of inerrantists, moderates, and 
agency heads, was to study the origins of the present controversy in order to recommend 
possible solutions.235 Consequently, Paschall and agency head Bill Hickem’s motion that the 
Peace Committee be formally established received majority support. Although much of the 
committee consisted of “bridge-builders” and “middle-of-the-road” Baptists, former 
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President Rogers and inerrantist Jerry Vines, moderates Cecil Sherman and William Hull, 
and agency heads Herschel Hobbs and Albert McClellan served as the most prominent 
members of the committee.236  
The coalition of moderates experienced the most debilitating events of its history in 
1986.237 Given Sherman’s position on the Peace Committee, moderates elected James Slatton 
to take charge of the moderate movement in his stead.238 At this point, the moderate 
movement finally had enough unity to create committees, distribute assignments, and employ 
a professional to manage the overall campaign. In short, moderates began to do what 
inerrantists had done since the outbreak of the Inerrancy Controversy.239 When the time came 
for the 1986 convention in Atlanta, the second largest in SBC history, moderates nominated 
Winfred Moore again.240 In what probably seemed like déjà vu to moderates, inerrantists 
nominated former President Rogers, who subsequently beat Moore 54 percent to 46.241 
Shortly after the gut-wrenching defeat in Atlanta, Sherman warned three of the 
seminary presidents involved in the moderates’ group via letter that deliberations within the 
Peace Committee had taken a dangerous turn. He spelled out the following concerns: first, 
inerrantists had no intention of settling for less than complete control of the SBC and all its 
agencies; second, agency heads wanted moderates to cease political activities and often sided 
with inerrantists when the committee voted on issues; third, the Peace Committee would 
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allow inerrantists to put pressure on the faculties of seminaries to teach only doctrines that 
harmonized with biblical inerrancy.242 Likely reflecting upon Sherman’s recent tidings, 
dismayed moderates gathered together at Mercer University in Macon, Georgia, for a 
meeting in August. Whereas some moderates possessed the drive and enthusiasm to organize 
another campaign for the 1987 convention, others expressed their unwillingness to continue 
engaging in politics. As a result, efforts to create the Southern Baptist Alliance took place 
among the latter. Those belonging to this new proto-denomination agreed to continue voting 
for moderates in the conventions; however, they would cease overtly political efforts, 
believing that the time for stopping the inerrantist movement had already passed.243 After a 
mere two years of politicking, moderates took a severe blow to their momentum. 
Agency heads met with the Peace Committee for a prayer retreat at the Glorieta 
Baptist Conference Center in Glorieta, New Mexico, in late October of 1986. More than fifty 
people gathered there to enjoy worship, testimonies, and discussion. The trappings of this 
retreat, however, did not negate business matters that needed to be discussed. According to 
Sherman, agency heads such as Midwestern Seminary’s President Milton Ferguson, 
Southeastern Seminary’s President Randall Lolley, and Southern Seminary’s President Roy 
Honeycutt attended out of necessity. The Peace Committee had placed each of them under 
special observation due to allegations that their seminaries propagated progressive 
theology.244 
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On October 22, 1986, President Ferguson presented a statement to the Peace 
Committee, thereafter known as the Glorieta Statement. Signed by the presidents of each of 
the SBC’s six seminaries, it read, “We believe the Bible is fully inspired; it is ‘God-
breathed,’ utterly unique. No other book or collection of books can justify that claim. The 
sixty-six books of the Bible are not errant in any area of reality.”245 Moreover, the seminary 
presidents told the Peace Committee that they would do their best to maintain equity in the 
seminaries, allowing biblical inerrancy to be taught and encouraged as a valid Baptist 
doctrine. This statement represented the antithesis of the traditional Baptist spirit they 
claimed to defend. When an outraged Sherman confronted Southwestern Seminary President 
Dilday, he replied, “Cecil, you are more trouble to us than those people are,” nodding to 
inerrantists. After berating President Lolley at breakfast the next morning, Sherman promptly 
resigned from the Peace Committee. In his eyes, the seminary presidents capitulated to 
inerrantists in order to save their schools. The most powerful moderates cut the heart out of 
the moderate movement: “The people we set out to save would not own us ... [they] no 
longer wanted our help.”246  
The Peace Committee had a death blow yet to deliver to the moderates at the St. 
Louis convention in 1987. Moderates chose Richard Jackson, a former ally of inerrantists, to 
oppose President Rogers’ reelection, supposing that he might be able to slow inerrantists’ 
momentum.247 At the remarkably slighter convention of 25,600 messengers, Jackson 
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managed only 40 percent of the vote, markedly less than Moore did the previous year.248 If 
that did not dampen moderate spirits enough, the Peace Committee submitted its final report 
to the Convention, noting its agreement that “all organized political factions [should] 
discontinue the organized political activity in which they are now engaged.” The report 
basically vindicated inerrantists: 
The controversy of the last decade began as a theological concern. When people of 
good intention became frustrated because they felt their convictions on Scripture were 
not seriously dealt with, they organized politically to make themselves heard. Soon, 
another group formed to counter the first and the political process intensified.249 
 
By claiming inerrantists had good intentions and purely theological concerns, the committee 
effectively placed the blame on moderates for intensifying the conflict. In addition, the 
committee deduced that peace within the SBC could be ascertained only if trustees and 
administrators of all SBC agencies and seminaries affirmed the Bible as “not errant in any 
area of reality.” With the subsequent adoption of this report, inerrantists defended themselves 
as victims who did what they needed to do to protect their beliefs. Moreover, they expressly 
forbade any future political activities and strongly encouraged all SBC employees to adhere 
to biblical inerrancy.250  
No other election since 1979 had been fought as fiercely as that of 1988.251 Given 
inerrantists’ nine consecutive victories and success in forcing the resignation of Southeastern 
President Randall Lolley in 1987, moderates campaigned vigorously to win at San 
Antonio.252 Still holding out hope that their victory could even the playing field, they once 
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again selected Richard Jackson as their candidate. Although Jerry Vines had previous 
exposure at Pastors’ Conferences like his predecessors, he had nowhere near the same 
popularity. In contrast, Jackson had supporters among both moderates and inerrantists.253 
When Jackson and Vines squared away at the San Antonio convention, they were also joined 
by two other candidates. 
Although attendance significantly dipped between the 1986 and 1987 conventions, 
the 1988 convention witnessed a spike. From a pool of 31,000 messengers, Vines took 50.5 
percent of the vote, leaving 48.3 to Jackson. According to Slatton, this represented the peak 
of the moderate networking effort.254 Further asserting their control, inerrantists adopted a 
controversial resolution at the 1988 San Antonio convention, which denigrated the way in 
which moderates and agency heads used the doctrine of “the priesthood of the believer” to 
“justify wrongly the attitude that a Christian may believe whatever he so chooses and still be 
considered a loyal Southern Baptist.” Resolution Five therefore concluded that the proper 
interpretation of the priesthood of the believer did not license Southern Baptists to question 
the inerrancy of the Bible.255 
Encouraged by their narrow margin of defeat, moderates restyled themselves as 
“centrists” and determinedly campaigned for the 1989 convention in Las Vegas. They 
launched “Baptists Committed to the Southern Baptist Convention” and chose self-professed 
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inerrantist Daniel Vestal to oppose President Vines’s reelection.256 Declaring that inerranists’ 
theology was not the issue so much as their exclusivist appointments, former Peace 
Committee member Vestal appeared to be a strong candidate. Empathizing with inerrantists, 
he contended “I do have theological concerns but am also committed to openness and 
freedom … There cannot be real unity in the SBC as long as you disenfranchise large groups 
of people.”257 Incumbent President Vines, however, strategically shifted the focus from 
denominational turmoil towards missions and evangelism.258 On election day, Vestal 
succeeded in raising only 43 percent of the vote from roughly 20,000 messengers, leaving 
President Vines with 57 percent.259 Within a few months, agency head Jimmy Allen took 
over leadership of Baptists Committed from previous leader Moore.260 
The last ditch effort of Baptists Committed to turn the tide precipitated the formal 
fragmentation of the SBC. Thirty-seven thousand messengers showed up at the New Orleans 
convention in 1990 to see if Vestal could defeat inerrantist candidate Morris Chapman. 
Although agency heads had never opposed an incumbent president during the Inerrancy 
Controversy, they now refused to offer a candidate during a regular election year. When the 
votes were tallied, Chapman received 58 percent of the vote to Vestal’s 42.261 In ecstasy over 
their victory, inerrantists then descended upon the Café du Monde singing “Victory in Jesus.” 
Presenting Pressler and Patterson with tokens of appreciation, they commemorated the 
legendary meeting of their two ringleaders back in 1967, when they first discussed their 
concerns over the future of the Convention.262 After twelve successive victories, inerrantists 
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now held enough sway over the Convention to effect whatever changes they saw necessary. 
Moderates never again opposed inerrantists for the presidential elections nor did they attend 
conventions en masse. Although some stayed in the Convention, many joined quasi-
denominations such as the Southern Baptist Alliance or the newly formed Cooperative 
Baptist Fellowship.263 Citing irreconcilable differences, moderates and inerrantists legally 
divorced. Agency heads who refused to politick found themselves powerless to resist 
inerrantists, resigning to uncomfortable lives of conformity under the new guard.264 The SBC 
would surely continue to experience conflicts in the next decade. However, the Inerrancy 
Controversy was officially over.  
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Chapter Four: Tug of War, 1971-1990 
 Southern Baptists fought over more than theology and politics; they fought about the 
SBC’s relationship to the surrounding culture. Agency heads had no qualms about 
responding judiciously to the Equal Rights Amendment and the Roe v. Wade decision, since 
moderates tended to lean towards the progressive side on these issues and inerrantists stood 
firmly on the conservative side. However, inerrantists interpreted agency heads’ stances as 
heretical, ambiguous, or too soft. While conservative religious activists like Phyllis Schafly, 
Beverly LaHaye, and Anita Bryant waged war against women’s liberation, the SBC’s own 
Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs and Christian Life Commission seemed to be 
encouraging the movement. By the mid to late 1970s, Jerry Falwell took part in the 
conservative counter-movement. Between the late 1970s and the late 1980s, inerrantists also 
became heavily involved in the culture wars, resembling the response of evangelicals outside 
of the SBC much more than that of moderates and agency heads. 
When inerrantists served on organizations like the Moral Majority, Religious 
Roundtable, and American Coalition for Traditional Values with Falwell, moderates and 
agency heads lambasted them. How could inerrantists fight to enforce their interpretations of 
cultural issues on all Americans, much less Southern Baptists? Being proponents of a strict 
separation between church and state, Foy Valentine and James Dunn became consistent 
targets for inerrantists’ attacks. How could moderates and agency heads maintain a separatist 
view of church and state when the state was issuing such overt threats to the church? 
Accordingly, the battle lines drawn around social issues in the 1970s and 1980s mirrored 
those drawn around biblical inerrancy. In effect, the Inerrancy Controversy represented 
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moderates’ contestation to inerrantists’ campaign for the right to interpret authoritatively the 
SBC’s theology, polity, and cultural engagement. 
Perhaps the clearest indicator of disparity between the SBC’s leadership and 
inerrantists was the chasm between their stances on abortion. Whether agency heads’ 
statements represented their own interpretations or those of the moderates they desired to 
protect, the Convention fervently fought over this issue. As early as 1971, Southern Baptists 
were divided as to whether they should oppose any legal abortion or allow it to be a “purely 
private matter between a woman and her doctor.” At the 1971 convention in St. Louis, they 
resolved that Southern Baptists should work for legislation that allowed the possibility of an 
abortion under the circumstances of “rape, incest, clear evidence of severe fetal deformity, 
and carefully ascertained evidence of the likelihood of damage to the emotional, mental, and 
physical health of the mother.”265  On the other hand, this did not appease those who 
expressed their views that all abortion was tantamount to murder.266 Carl F. H. Henry, an 
outspoken evangelical critic of abortion and ideological godfather of many inerrantists, had 
already maintained that abortion was a three party issue, affecting mother, father, and child. 
Consequently, he reasoned, it could not be a private issue between a woman and her 
doctor.267 
In the immediate wake of Roe v. Wade, moderates and agency heads clearly 
controlled the terms of the debate on abortion. On January 31, 1973, W. Barry Garrett of 
                                                        
265 “Resolution on Abortion,” Southern Baptist Convention, 1971, accessed February 23, 2016, 
http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/13/resolution-on-abortion; Morgan, 23. For those who opposed legal abortion, 
an exception was made only if the life of the mother was threatened.   
266 “Resolution on Abortion and the Sanctity of Life,” Southern Baptist Convention, 1974, accessed February 
23, 2016, http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/14/resolution-on-abortion-and-sanctity-of-human-life. At the 1974 
convention, messengers interpreted the 1971 resolution as a balance “between the extreme of abortion on 
demand and the opposite extreme of all abortion as murder.” 
267 Carl F. H. Henry, “Abortion: An Evangelical View” in Jerry Falwell and the Rise of the Religious Right: A 
Brief History with Documents, ed. Matthew Avery Sutton (Boston, Massachusetts: Bedford, 2013), 95-96. 
 72 
Baptist Press maintained that the Roe v. Wade decision “advanced the cause of religious 
liberty, human equality, and justice.” In contrast to the Roman Catholic hierarchy, which 
vehemently opposed the decision, Garrett continued, “there is no official Southern Baptist 
position on abortion.” This was simply a matter of conscience.268 Garrett’s opinion fit quite 
cohesively with the St. Louis convention’s 1971 resolution. Surprisingly, inerrantist W. A. 
Criswell responded that since the child only became an individual person after birth, the 
rights and health of the mother ought to be prioritized.269 However, this likely illustrated how 
little inerrantists had thought about abortion, as historian Barry Hankins suggested.270 After 
Senator James Buckley introduced a constitutional amendment that would overturn Roe v. 
Wade, the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs’ [BJCPA] executive director James 
Wood Jr. immediately opposed it. Wood argued that the state “should not embody into law 
one particular religious or moral viewpoint on which differing views are held by substantial 
sections of the religious and nonreligious communities.”271 Nonetheless, the 1974 convention 
in Dallas saw the abortion issue resurface, suggesting that inerrantists were displeased with 
the 1971 resolution. No doubt, the resolution “On Abortion and Sanctity of Human Life” 
further angered inerrantists. When Dallas messengers reaffirmed the 1971 resolution and 
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defended it as having been dealt with “responsibly from a Christian perspective,” they 
implied that to oppose said resolution was irresponsible.272  
Inerrantists made their dissatisfaction with the denominational leadership much more 
visible in the mid to late 1970s. A resolution passed by messengers at the 1976 convention in 
Norfolk, Virginia, bore a few traces of the rising escalation over the abortion issue. 
Interestingly, agency heads made some concessions for inerrantists. First, they noted that 
“the practice of abortion for selfish non-therapeutic reasons wantonly destroys fetal life.” 
Second, agency heads agreed that each abortion, no matter the circumstances, spelled the 
termination of an innocent life. Third, they admonished Southern Baptists to work to change 
the attitudes and conditions that encouraged people to resort to abortion as a means of birth 
control. That agency heads felt the need to make these statements rather than reaffirm the 
1971 resolution confirmed that inerrantists had put pressure on them. This resolution 
revealed what inerrantists felt was problematic about the legalization of abortion: that the 
unborn signified a third party, in Carl F. H. Henry’s words, and that most people who sought 
abortion did so for selfish reasons. Conceding these concerns, agency heads went on to 
“support the right of expectant mothers to the full range of medical services and personal 
counseling for the preservation of life and health.” In addition, they affirmed that the 
government deserved no more than a limited role in dealing with matters related to 
abortion.273 
This did not bring any semblance of closure to the matter, however. In 1977, CLC 
director Foy Valentine drew the ire of inerrantists when he signed the “Call to Concern,” a 
statement issued by the Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights. Responding to Roe v. Wade 
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opposition, Valentine and the other four Southern Baptist signers articulated their desire to 
protect the rights of impoverished women and called upon “the leaders of religious groups 
supporting abortion rights to speak out more clearly and publicly in response to the 
dangerously increasing influence of the absolutist position.”274 When the abortion issue 
resurfaced at the 1977 convention in Kansas City, agency heads were at pains to express that 
the 1976 resolution represented a “strong stand against abortion.”275 Thus, the Convention 
voted to reaffirm the previous resolution. The issue did not dissipate. In 1978, Valentine 
accepted an invitation from the chairperson of the Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights to 
become one of their national sponsors.276 When abortion again received the limelight at the 
Atlanta convention in 1978, agency heads attempted to quell the issue by maintaining that 
they had already spoken “clearly and forthrightly” about it at the previous convention.277 
Clearly, inerrantists and agency heads did not agree. Hankins rightly interpreted the 
successive resolutions of the past five years as a sign that pro-life forces were gaining 
momentum.278 
 When Southern Baptists fought about women’s rights, they did not fight each other 
about the Equal Rights Amendment so much as its perceived implication for women’s 
ordination and feminism. When the ERA was ratified in 1972 by twenty-two out of the 
necessary thirty-eight states, the SBC exhibited mixed response.279 In 1973, Southern 
Seminary students publicly professed their support for women in virtually all areas of 
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ministry. This was followed by President Duke McCall’s statement that “most Baptists have 
long since explained [the Apostle Paul’s] admonitions to women to keep silent in the church 
as being rooted in a local situation.”280 However, at the 1973 convention in Portland, Oregon, 
messenger Jessie Sappington moved that the Convention address the harmful effects of the 
women’s liberation movement on Christian women. Although a couple of women opposed 
her motion, Joyce Rogers wholeheartedly endorsed it, claiming that women are “liberated in 
Christ” without assuming positions of authority.281 Messengers subsequently passed the 
resolution that acknowledged feminists’ “great attack” upon Christian women and exhorted 
Southern Baptists to remember “God’s order of authority for his church and the Christian 
home: (1) Christ the head of every man; (2) man the head of the woman; (3) children in 
subjection to their parents—in the Lord.”282 
 The 1973 resolution plainly did not represent the voice of all Southern Baptists. In 
fact, between the time that Congress passed the ERA in March, 1972, and the convention in 
1974, eleven Southern Baptist women received ordination. In addition, women in SBC 
seminaries increasingly began to express their desire for ordination.283 Thus, the CLC took it 
upon themselves to act as the Southern Baptist vehicle for women’s liberation. At the 1974 
convention in Dallas, the CLC’s Herbert Howard proposed the adoption of its report, 
“Freedom for Women.” In this report, the CLC exhorted SBC churches and agencies to reject 
discrimination against women in job placement, provide equal pay for equal work, and elect 
women to positions of leadership. Sappington immediately moved that the Convention table 
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the report, criticizing its support for women’s ordination. Messengers overwhelmingly 
obliged Sappington’s request.284 Following the convention, Western Recorder’s C. R. Daley 
commended SBC leaders for “refusing to endorse the ultra-conservative view or the ultra-
progressive view on theology and social issues.”285 Refusing to accept their recent defeat, the 
CLC hosted a Christian Liberation for Contemporary Women conference in Glorieta, New 
Mexico. Likely based on the desire to present multiple Southern Baptist views on abortion 
and women’s rights, Broadman Press published the fourteen lectures given at the 
conference.286 
 Over the next few years, the women’s rights issue became more polarized and 
complex. As with the abortion issue, a Catholic activist sounded the first trumpet call against 
the ERA. After Congress passed the ERA in 1972, Phyllis Schafly immediately formed 
STOP ERA in order to counter what she perceived to be a threat to the American family.287 
Before the 1974 convention, Joyce Rogers published a pamphlet that defended wives’ 
submission to their husbands as God’s plan rather than patriarchal chauvinism.288 Between 
1974 and 1978, while ordained Southern Baptist women more than tripled in number, Baptist 
women Anita Bryant and Beverly LaHaye publicly launched an anti-feminist campaign.289 
Moreover, they laid the framework for the Christian Right’s family values campaign by 
linking feminism to abortion, divorce, and homosexuality. When the issue of homosexuality 
came before the 1976 convention in Norfolk, Virginia, messengers overwhelmingly 
supported the motion that urged churches and agencies “not to afford the practice of 
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homosexuality any degree of approval through ordination, employment, or other designations 
of normal lifestyle.”290 In addition, messengers at the 1977 convention in Kansas City voted 
overwhelmingly to pass a resolution commending Bryant for her “courageous stand against 
the evils inherent in homosexuality.”291 
 In the years leading up to the outbreak of the Inerrancy Controversy, agency heads 
viewed the prospect of women ministers with cautious optimism. In 1977, Baptist historian 
H. Leon McBeth observed the rising percentage of women seminarians preparing to be 
ministers, noting that the new factor in the Southern Baptist debate over women’s ordination 
was the presence of “a cadre of female teachers and scholars.” He predicted that Southern 
Baptists would likely follow suit as their host culture granted more rights to women.292 
Although messengers at the 1978 convention in Atlanta passed a resolution decrying 
Congress’s proposal that the time period for the ratification of the ERA be extended, the 
mood of the Convention seemed to be gradually swinging toward the ordination of 
women.293 In September of 1978 the SBC Inter-Agency Council hosted a Consultation on 
Women in Church-Related Vocations conference at the Sunday School Board’s headquarters, 
attracting a crowd of nearly three hundred. Nearly every significant denominational post was 
represented at this conference.294  
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The unofficial purpose of this conference, wrote historian Elizabeth Flowers, was to 
discuss the status of women’s ordination. Two professors from Southern Seminary and a 
handful of women of various occupations put pressure on agency heads to create an 
environment in the SBC that cultivated equal opportunities for women.295 In response, Roy 
Honeycutt, provost of Southern Seminary, advised women not to seek ordination if they 
desired marketability. Too few churches welcomed the ordination of women. On the other 
hand, SBC President Jimmy Allen affirmed women’s ordination. After likening this issue to 
the Civil Rights movement and revealing that he had voted for the ERA, President Allen 
encouraged all those present to “as a family work to remove artificial barricades for service 
from all the family members.” In bureaucratic fashion, he nevertheless cautioned women to 
seek a balance between persistence and patience.296 
Moderates seemed most likely to support the ERA, women’s ordination, and abortion. 
Agency heads certainly exhibited caution in their approval of these matters. However, the 
response of a local pastor from Lynchburg, Virginia, most closely resembled the utter 
revulsion felt by inerrantists. After enjoying a religious upbringing and a short period of 
adolescent rebellion, Jerry Falwell left his hometown of Lynchburg, Virginia, to attend an 
independent Baptist seminary in the Midwest. When he completed his theological education, 
he returned and became pastor of Thomas Road Baptist Church. Between 1956 and 1971, 
Falwell launched his own successful radio and television ministry, founded Liberty Christian 
Academy, and established Liberty University.297 Before the Supreme Court’s 1973 ruling, he 
had abstained from secular politicking, thinking it inappropriate for religious ministers. 
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Although he had passionately followed the abortion debate for some time, he let well enough 
alone by simply preaching against it to his congregation and through his radio and television 
ministry.298 Upon reading the January 23, 1973, edition of the Lynchburg News, however, the 
same Falwell who denigrated preachers for taking political action in his fiery “Ministers and 
Marches” sermon in 1965 now proclaimed the government untrustworthy to “correct its own 
ills.”299 Initially, he involved himself in politics the only way he knew how, exhorting his 
congregation and the listeners of his media ministry towards “all-out political 
involvement.”300  
As the 1970s progressed, Falwell’s distaste for Roe v. Wade and reverence for 
theologian Francis Schaeffer catapulted him into his first de facto campaign. In 1976, 
Schaeffer published the book and complementary film How Shall We Then Live?, in which 
he laid out his solid stance against abortion and called on Christians to “stem the tide of 
‘secular humanism.’”301 Schaeffer’s writings profoundly influenced the Lynchburg reverend, 
particularly challenging him that to work with those of different religious backgrounds for a 
common good did not necessitate “compromise of theological integrity.”302 It was not 
coincidental that Falwell organized his I Love America tour the same year that Schaeffer 
published his influential book and spoke to college campuses around the nation. The I Love 
America tour was a musical program that boasted seventy students from Liberty University. 
Visiting over 140 cities, Falwell used this tour as a platform to address what he termed 
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America’s “national sin,” abortion.303 At the end of each musical program, he exhorted 
pastors and laity to take political action against abortion “and the other social trends that 
menaced the nation’s future.”304 
As the Inerrancy Controversy drew near, Falwell’s campaign began to emulate that of 
Beverly LaHaye and Anita Bryant. In 1978, Falwell published How You Can Help Clean Up 
America. In this book, he defended Bryant’s firm stance against homosexuality, claiming that 
such a practice was contrary to the Bible and “the divine order of the home.”305 During the 
same year, Falwell and his musical team from Liberty created a multi-media presentation 
called America, You’re Too Young to Die! He concluded each performance with the solemn 
admonition that God gave the Israelites in the biblical book of Second Chronicles: “If my 
people, which are called by my name, shall humble themselves, and pray, and seek my face, 
and turn from their wicked ways; then will I hear from heaven, and will forgive their sin, and 
will heal their land.”306 Falwell’s programs awarded him favor with equally concerned 
religious conservatives across the country. Indeed, by January of 1979, he had discussed the 
possibility of organizing a political group of concerned conservatives with Ed McAteer, a 
well-traveled Southern Baptist businessman and member of Adrian Rogers’s church.307 
McAteer, in David Morgan’s words, represented the most direct link between the SBC and 
the Religious Right.308 
The climax of Falwell’s politicking efforts came in the spring of 1979. In April, he 
and his musical crew took their I Love America presentations to forty-four state capitals. At 
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each capital, he intentionally met with like-minded pastors and lay leaders, resulting in a 
substantial network of contacts. Along with the rallies held by Paul Pressler and Paige 
Patterson, as well as Harold Lindsell’s timely tract propagating the dangers of 
progressivism309, Falwell’s musical presentations likely played a role in inspiring grassroots 
Baptists to vote for an inerrantist president at the 1979 convention in June. When Falwell 
hosted a meeting with a group of religious leaders in May, his friend and Catholic political 
activist Paul Weyrich said, “Jerry, there is in America a moral majority that agrees about the 
basic issues. But they aren’t organized. They don’t have a platform. The media ignore them. 
Somebody’s got to get that moral majority together.”310 Another Catholic activist, Richard 
Viguerie, discussed with Weyrich and Falwell the necessity of organizing the growing 
number of grassroots Christian activists into a “consistent voting bloc that would bolster the 
power of the conservative wing of the GOP.”311 Their deliberations resulted in the 
incorporation of the Moral Majority on June 1, 1979, ten days before the controversial 
election of SBC President Adrian Rogers; its board of directors conspicuously featured 
inerrantist Charles Stanley and Tim LaHaye.312 
Shortly after President Rogers’ election, zealous inerrantists formally began their 
political involvement with Falwell.313 At the 1979 convention, inerrantists had failed to pass 
an amendment preventing ordained women from serving in domestic or foreign mission 
fields. Moreover, their amendment to “call upon [Southern Baptists] to work on all levels of 
government … to protect the personhood of all human life at all stages of development 
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whether born or unborn,” was also unsuccessful.314 Messengers voted to reaffirm the 
previous resolutions on abortion.315 However, inerrantists took matters into their own hands 
after the convention. In late 1979, McAteer formed the Religious Roundtable, an 
organization of pastors, businessmen, and politicians designed to help other Religious Right 
groups strategize and implement “biblical responsibility in government.”316 By biblical 
responsibility, he specified that America needed to get back to family values and away from 
its national sin. One of its chief aims was to “reach into the Southern Baptist Convention … 
as well as other conservative denominations.” The board of directors featured Paige 
Patterson, James Robison, Charles Stanley, and Adrian Rogers. Moreover, W.A. Criswell, 
Bill Powell, Tim LaHaye, North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms, and Jerry Falwell served on 
the Roundtable’s Council of 56.317   
A few events in October demonstrated that inerrantists were not the only ones 
politically inclined. Having caught wind of Valentine’s affiliation with the National Coalition 
of Abortion Rights, one inerrantist wrote to the editor of Indiana Baptist, questioning the 
posture of the CLC’s director as representing all Southern Baptists. Valentine soon wrote the 
editor and advised him not to respond. Any response from him might dignify the inerrantist’s 
complaint.318 In addition, the BJCPA’s James Wood joined two professors from Southern in 
endorsing “A Religious Statement on Abortion: A Call to Commitment.” Whatever they 
argued, once Baptist Press published the statement, inerrantists interpreted it as advocacy for 
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abortion. Furthermore, the National Abortion Rights Action League released a list of 
numerous religious organizations that supported the right to choose abortion. Inerrantists’ 
jaws dropped in horror when both the BJCPA and the SBC itself appeared on the list.319  
In January of 1980, Falwell published Listen, America!, a book explaining the de 
facto mission of the Moral Majority. To change America, he proclaimed, moral Americans 
needed to become registered voters, get informed about moral issues, and involve themselves 
in the political process. He laid out three primary concerns: abortion, homosexuality, and the 
decline of the biblically defined family.320 Falwell cited Schafly’s statement that “the 
women’s liberation movement is antifamily.” Since feminists supported the ERA and 
homosexuality, she argued, they would ultimately “use legislation to eliminate the eternal 
differences and the roles that God has ordained between men and women.”321 Moreover, 
their advocacy for women’s rights denigrated motherhood as a task “that is unrewarding, 
unfulfilling, and boring,” precipitating a sharp increase in support for abortion.322 Echoing 
Schafly’s arguments, Falwell enthusiastically described a woman’s calling to be a wife and 
mother as “the highest calling in the world.”323 The specter of women flooding the workplace 
and abandoning these “special rights” spelled the death of the institution of the family. He 
reasoned that, since women in Bible-believing homes already boasted more-than-equal 
rights, the ERA in fact promised the removal of rights from women.324 In response to these 
societal ills, the silent majority must become the moral majority, exclaimed Falwell.325 
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Within a year of the Roundtable’s founding, inerrantists and Falwell had already 
made significant headway in their aspiration to work towards biblical responsibility in the 
government. Inerrantists began to use Schaeffer’s pro-life film Whatever Happened to the 
Human Race? as a teaching tool in their churches.326 Following the publishing of Listen 
America!, President Rogers, Charles Stanley, and Patterson joined Falwell in urging removal 
of the issue of prayer in schools from the jurisdiction of federal courts.327 Moreover, the SBC 
president enjoyed the role of featured speaker at the “Washington for Jesus” rally in April, an 
event coordinated by Falwell. President Rogers used as his text the passage of Second 
Chronicles that Falwell himself had used countless times before.328 Thus, inerrantists arrived 
at the 1980 convention in St. Louis ready to contend with the establishment over the issue of 
abortion.  
After failing on five separate occasions to overturn the 1971 resolution in favor of an 
explicitly pro-life resolution, inerrantists finally tasted victory. St. Louis messengers passed a 
remarkably strident resolution, which condemned policies that allowed “abortion on 
demand,” denigrated the use of taxes for “selfish, non-therapeutic abortion,” and favored 
legislation that prohibited abortion “except to save the life of the mother.”329 Responding to a 
recent spike in political activists’ attempts to give legal recognition and benefits to 
homosexual couples, messengers also felt the need to reiterate the basic position taken in the 
1976 resolution and to reaffirm the “traditional position of Southern Baptists” that 
homosexuality was condemned by the Bible.330 Although inerrantists had not yet gained the 
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momentum to push through a strong statement against women’s ordination, they evidently 
persuaded enough messengers to stress “the equal worth but not always the sameness of 
function of women” and agree not to endorse the ERA.331  
 In August of 1980, Falwell and inerrantists appeared at a Public Affairs Briefing in 
Dallas, Texas, organized by the Roundtable’s vice-president James Robison. McAteer had 
sent invitations to all three of the prominent presidential candidates, current President Jimmy 
Carter, John Anderson, and Ronald Reagan. In a stroke of fate, only Reagan accepted the 
invitation. Former SBC President Rogers, SBC President Bailey Smith, Phyllis Schafly, Jesse 
Helms, Paige Patterson, Paul Pressler, televangelist Pat Robertson, and Jerry Falwell 
attended this pivotal convention. Responding to recent claims that the separation of church 
and state should keep religious activists out of the government, Robison thundered, “Neither 
our founding fathers nor Jesus Christ initiated the godless interpretation of separation of 
church and state as it is presently presented to so many American people.”332 If the religious 
do not have any part in policy making or political activity, he asked, who will? After W.A. 
Criswell introduced Reagan, the presidential candidate boldly said to his audience, “Now I 
know this is a non-partisan gathering and so I know that you can’t endorse me but … I want 
you to know that I endorse you and what you are doing.”333 Moreover, he encouraged 
attendees that “the First Amendment was not written to protect the people and their laws 
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from religious values, but to protect those values from government tyranny.”334 In 
conclusion, Falwell urged the audience to “vote for the Reagan of their choice.”335 
 As inerrantists became friendlier with denominational outsiders and politicians, 
moderates became their staunchest opponents. Wood wrote that “extreme, far right groups 
that are very militant and strident” dominated the 1980 convention.336 Moreover, Foy 
Valentine of the CLC issued a pamphlet the following year that undermined inerrantists’ pro-
life resolution. While he agreed that the unborn fetus had a right to live, Valentine claimed 
that Christian love and justice were not served by “extremely restrictive laws which do not 
give conscientious people … the opportunity to choose when they are faced with very grave 
moral dilemmas related to abortion.” The CLC director lamented with inerrantists that Roe v. 
Wade allowed citizens to use abortion as birth control. However, he cautioned, that did not 
necessitate the whole nation’s adherence to the “Roman Catholic dogma related to abortion.” 
This statement was tantamount to calling inerrantists extremists.337 When messengers passed 
a resolution at the 1981 convention that praised the BJCPA and the CLC for their leadership 
in problems regarding religious liberty and the separation of church and state, inerrantists 
learned that they still had an uphill battle.338 In years to come, both agencies would come 
under a hailstorm of criticism from inerrantists.339 
 The more inerrantists pushed the Convention towards the right, the harder moderates 
fought to pull it back. To the chagrin of moderates, Falwell appeared by personal invitation 
from President Bailey Smith to a CLC conference in 1982. Making matters worse, he joined 
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a gathering of 42,000 in the New Orleans Superdome shortly before the start of the 1982 
convention.340 To this crowd, Vice-President George Bush proclaimed that the political 
mobilization of evangelicals was a healthy development: “I embrace the constructive 
contributions it can make to strengthening the United States as one nation under God.”341 
Although Falwell was not present at the convention itself, he met with President Smith, 
former President Rogers, McAteer, and Stanley.342  
Consequently, messengers at the convention passed a bold resolution on abortion. 
Whereas the 1980 resolution favored legislation that would restrict abortion, the 1982 
resolution exhorted Southern Baptists to work for legislation “and/or a constitutional 
amendment which will prohibit abortions except to save the physical life of the mother.”343 
This explicit endorsement of political activity clearly resembled Falwell’s perception of 
church and state relations more than that of agency heads or moderates. Several editors of 
Baptist news agencies subsequently suspected that the Religious Right orchestrated the 
resolution.344 One editor reflected, “It is now evident that our Convention has evolved into 
two political parties.”345 James Dunn, James Wood’s successor, subjected the BJCPA into 
further scrutiny when he accused inerrantists of forsaking their identity as “church-state 
separationists” who had embraced “medieval doctrines that we have so long resisted.”346 
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 Despite inerrantists’ growing opposition to the ERA and its implications, women’s 
ordination rose sharply from less than twenty in 1974 to two hundred in 1983.347 Obviously, 
the 1980 statement did not settle the women’s issue. It came up at both the 1981 and 1983 
conventions. However, the former simply reaffirmed the 1980 statement and the latter 
managed only to add the clause, “For women who serve the Lord as homemakers, we affirm 
their special calling, honor them for their unique contributions to church and society, and 
support their rights to financial security.”348 While certainly hinting to the role in society that 
inerrantists thought women should play, they still lacked enough support to pass an explicit 
denunciation of women’s ordination and the ERA. 
The resolution “on ordination and the role of women in ministry” passed at the 1984 
convention, in Elizabeth Flowers’s words, “pointed to [inerrantists’] crucial link with that 
outside evangelical world.”349 To the euphoria of inerrantists and the dismay of moderates, 
Carl F. H. Henry presented the resolution. After emphasizing that women ought not to 
assume a role of authority over men, he concluded that women should serve “in all aspects of 
church life and work other than pastoral functions and leadership roles entailing ordination.” 
Citing the Apostle Paul, women were excluded from pastoral leadership “to preserve a 
submission God requires because the man was first in creation and the woman was first in the 
Edenic fall.” In contrast, women were admonished to build godly homes.350 Agency head 
Wayne Dehoney immediately declared the resolution unconstitutional since it interfered with 
local church autonomy. In other words, he declared that each church held the jurisdiction to 
                                                        
347 Kidd, 242; Flowers, 106. 
348 “Resolution on Women,” Southern Baptist Convention, 1983, accessed March 5, 2016, 
http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/1093/resolution-on-women. 
349 Flowers, 102. 
350 “Resolution on Ordination and the Role of Women in Ministry,” Southern Baptist Convention, 1984, 
accessed March 5, 2016,  http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/1088/resolution-on-ordination-and-the-role-of-women-
in-ministry. 
 89 
ordain women, according to its respective interpretation of the Bible. In spite of many 
messengers’ frustrations, the resolution passed by a 58 percent vote.351 
 The 1984 convention witnessed animosity over much more than women’s ordination. 
James Dunn proved more of an irritation to inerrantists than his predecessor. The new 
director of the BJCPA had received criticism for his ties to the controversial organization 
People for the American Way [PAW]. Headed by Norman Lear, PAW used television to 
counter those who ostensibly threatened the First Amendment.352 However, Dunn likely also 
came under attack due to a comment he had given to an editor from USA Today the year 
before. Following the Senate’s defeat of legislation that would have severely limited 
abortion, he quipped, “Most people have the inherent good sense not to be forever misled by 
religious or political demagoguery.” Previously, he had fought in the Baptist General 
Convention of Texas for support of the “use of public funds for abortion.”353  
Unsurprisingly, motions concerning both the BJCPA and abortion surfaced in Kansas 
City. One inerrantist proposed that the Convention eliminate its funding of the BJCPA. It 
ultimately failed.354 However, this motion would come up several more times in the near 
future. Moreover, inerrantists successfully inched the Convention further away from any 
position that could be even remotely deemed pro-choice. In the 1984 resolution, abortion was 
identified as a national sin, the very term Falwell had used. Conspicuously, inerrantists called 
on SBC agencies and institutions to prepare “literature to take a clear and strong stand 
against abortion, and to inform and motivate our members to action to eliminate abortion on 
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demand.”355 They also renewed their commitment to work for legislation that prohibited 
abortion. 
In addition to witnessing a turbulent SBC convention, 1984 saw a further 
solidification of inerrantists, Falwell, and the Religious Right. In the spring, Moral Majority 
member Tim LaHaye founded the American Coalition for Traditional Values [ACTV]. 
Serving on its board of governors were SBC President James Draper, Former President 
Adrian Rogers, Charles Stanley, Jerry Falwell, and televangelist Jimmy Swaggart. The 
ACTV aspired to catalyze a massive voter registration at churches with the end goal of 
securing incumbent President Reagan’s reelection. Moreover, the new organization identified 
the prohibition of abortion and opposition to homosexual rights as two of its chief 
concerns.356 In August, inerrantists gathered at the Republican National Convention [RNC] 
in Dallas, Texas, a spectacle reminiscent of the Roundtable’s 1980 briefing. According to 
scholar Ellen Rosenberg, former SBC President James Draper appeared before the 
Republican Platform Committee on behalf of the ACTV, lamenting that the SBC would not 
give him “an equal opportunity to take strong positions” on issues like religious liberty and 
homosexuality.357 James Robison gave the invocation on the opening day and W. A. Criswell 
delivered the benediction on the final day. Jerry Falwell also merited the opportunity to speak 
before the convention, thanking God for a political party dedicated to the “liberation of the 
unborn.”358 Although Falwell and inerrantists had endorsed President Reagan in 1980, this 
occasion marked the formal wedding of the Religious Right to the Republican Party.359 
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 The heated 1985 convention represented the first fruits of inerrantists’ 
interdenominational liaisons. At the beginning of the year, former President Bailey Smith 
instituted “Real Evangelism,” an organization that would host annual three-day conferences 
pertaining to matters of religious significance. Falwell appeared at the premier conference in 
January to discuss the moral issues threatening Christians.360 In February, he received an 
invitation to speak on abortion to Criswell’s own First Baptist Church in Dallas, Texas, 
where Falwell predicted that abortion would soon be outlawed in America as a result of 
President Reagan’s reelection.361 He also declared that the SBC would split if President 
Stanley was not reelected in June.362 Following Falwell’s remarks, the director of the CLC 
cautioned Southern Baptists “to act with discernment, judgment, compassion, wisdom, and 
courage” in dealing with the issue of abortion. In order to deal with it properly, “[we] must 
support the prevention of unwanted pregnancies.”363 When televangelist Pat Robertson 
hosted former SBC Presidents Rogers, Smith, and Draper on his “700 Club” in April, each of 
the inerrantists reiterated the dire necessity of reelecting President Stanley. Robertson 
subsequently urged churches to respond to the crisis in the SBC by sending messengers to the 
convention to support the incumbent president.364 With public endorsements from Falwell, 
Robertson, and Billy Graham, President Stanley earned enough votes for reelection. 
 In 1986, signs of a denominational schism became increasingly visible. Although 
Valentine was on a contract to retire from the CLC at sixty-five years of age, he undercut 
inerrantists’ ascendancy by retiring early. Probably foreseeing that inerrantists would soon 
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possess enough power to elect and terminate virtually whoever they wanted, the director 
made known his concerns to the CLC’s chairman and retired the next month.  The chairman 
in turn set up a search committee in April in order to secure the hiring of a non-inerrantist 
director. They would not make their choice public until the 1987 convention.365 At the 1986 
convention, inerrantists again moved that the BJCPA be defunded. The question of to what 
extent the commission represented the views of the majority of the SBC concerned 
inerrantists most. For a second time, this motion fell short of the necessary majority vote. 
However, the Executive Committee agreed to appoint a study committee for the purposes of 
investigating the BJCPA and its relationship with the Convention.366  
Following the convention, Patterson announced inerrantists’ expectations to tie the 
hiring of denominational employees to their positions on social issues: “We want an open, 
pro-life position in all of our institutions and agencies dealing with both abortion and 
euthanasia. We want to be pro-family, pro-prayer anywhere.” He emphasized that the actual 
posture of the Convention “is far more conservative than most of its leadership on social and 
moral issues.”367 The CLC responded by organizing a conference comprised of pastors, laity, 
and denominational workers to discuss a compromise on the abortion issue. Its chairman 
hoped that if they produced a statement, they might pass it as a resolution at the 1987 
convention, allowing for inerrantists and moderates to “stop fighting each other over 
exceptions and start fighting together against abortion.”368 
Valentine’s early retirement certainly preserved a portion of the CLC’s autonomy, 
albeit only for a couple of years. In January of 1987, the CLC elected the academic vice 
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president of Midwestern Seminary, Larry Baker, as their new executive director by a 16 to 13 
vote. Given Baker’s support of women’s ordination and his refusal to endorse explicit pro-
life legislation, inerrantists did not give the new director an enthusiastic welcome. In fact, 
they immediately gathered together to discuss his dismissal, warning that he might only 
enjoy a six-month tenure.369 When the CLC presented its statement on abortion, inerrantists 
likely interpreted it as a step towards the pro-choice position. Rather than adopt the 
statement, messengers voted for a resolution that encouraged the CLC to “actively lobby for 
legislation to protect the lives of the unborn; and … continue to make the abortion issue a 
priority on its agenda.”370 Perhaps in response to the CLC’s hiring of a director who 
supported women’s ordination, messengers adopted a resolution that honored full-time wives 
and mothers for their honoring of God’s purposes in their lives each day.371 
As a result of the 1987 convention, inerrantists acquired a few seats on the CLC. 
According to plan, they attempted to unseat Baker at a CLC Trustee meeting in September. 
After attacking the director for his positions on abortion and women’s ordination, inerrantists 
only garnered fifteen of thirty votes. However, they did succeed in passing a motion that 
declared abortion to be only justifiable “when the developing child represents a clear and 
present danger to the physical life of the mother.”372 In spite of inerrantists’ failure to fire 
Baker, he recognized that his time was short. Thus, he resigned from the CLC and accepted a 
pastorate in Louisiana in May of 1988.373 A year after inerrantists’ attempt to remove Baker, 
they secured the election of Richard Land, the academic vice president of Criswell College. 
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Unlike Valentine and Baker, Land felt that the CLC needed to be “on the cutting edge of the 
prolife movement of Southern Baptists and in our society.”374 He also represented 
inerrantists’ own stances on virtually every issue. As Land later recalled, “When I was 
elected as the executive director, the Christian Life Commission shifted 180 degrees.”375 
Inaugurated just prior to the Inerrancy Controversy, the Moral Majority concluded its 
work a year before inerrantists sealed their victory. Jerry Falwell had joined hands with 
inerrantists in the Religious Right for roughly a decade, serving on the same organizations, 
speaking publicly about the same issues, and using his media savvy to endorse the inerrantist 
movement in the SBC.376 At a conference held in June of 1989, Falwell formally announced 
the dissolution of the Moral Majority, explaining that “we’ve accomplished everything we 
set out to do.” Responding to speculation about his involvement in the Inerrancy 
Controversy, he claimed that he had not struck a deal with inerrantists to help them take over 
the SBC. Falwell further stated that he had no intention in joining the Convention since his 
church already possessed its own school and mission board.377 Of course, he proclaimed, the 
SBC “is the hope of Bible-believing Christians everywhere.”378 The reverend saw the 
transformation of the nation’s largest Protestant denomination as a microcosm of what he 
dreamed America might look like. 
The fate of the BJCPA resembled that of the CLC. In 1989, after inerrantists had 
made a handful of unsuccessful attempts to defund the BJCPA, the Executive Committee 
proposed the creation of a Religious Liberty Commission, a commission that would represent 
                                                        
374 Sutton, Baptist, 315. 
375 Sutton, Baptist, 316. 
376 Ammerman, Baptist, 361. Falwell used his Fundamentalist Journal to endorse SBC President Jerry Vines 
and former Presidents Draper and Rogers. 
377 Hefley, 81. 
378 Ammerman, Baptist, 106. 
 95 
the views and interests of inerrantists in Washington, D.C. This would prevent the BJCPA 
from continuing to speak on behalf of the SBC. President Jerry Vines, however, persuaded 
inerrantists to delay this issue until after the 1989 convention. When they moved once more 
to defund the BJCPA at the 1989 convention, they failed by a narrow margin. On the other 
hand, the Executive Committee designated extra funding to the CLC for its office in 
Washington; since inerrantists could not defund the BJCPA, rather than establish a Religious 
Liberty Commission, they changed the function of the CLC to include political action on 
church-state issues. At the 1990 convention, inerrantists finally succeeded in reducing the 
BJCPA’s funding from $391,000 to $50,000.379 Although the committee was not entirely 
defunded, moderates knew that the fight was over. Within another year, the SBC formally 
severed ties with the BJCPA. The following decade would see the further consolidation of 
inerrantists’ stances on social issues throughout the Convention, its seminaries, and its 
agencies.  
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Epilogue: Reconstructing Zion 
After their glorious victory at the New Orleans convention, four significant events 
further consolidated inerrantists’ leadership of the SBC, beginning with R. Albert Mohler 
Jr.’s inauguration as president of Southern Seminary in 1993. President Mohler’s first couple 
of years at Southern represented a microcosm of the Inerrancy Controversy.380 He had 
completed both his M.Div. and Ph.D. at Southern, even serving as chief assistant to former 
President Roy Honeycutt. This likely explains why only half of the faculty had voted against 
Mohler’s nomination.381 However, he also was heavily influenced by his mentor Carl F. H. 
Henry and eventually self-identified with the inerrantist camp.382 Regardless, it likely came 
as a shock to Southern professors when he demanded that each faculty member subscribe to a 
four-pronged litmus test: “the inerrancy of Scripture, opposition to women’s ordination, a 
pro-life position on abortion … and opposition to homosexuality.”383  
In his first year, President Mohler charged theology professor Molly Marshall with 
violating her mandate to teach according to Southern Baptist doctrine. She had previously 
been accused numerous times of teaching inclusivism, a doctrine that inerrantists felt denied 
the inerrancy of the Bible. Thus, the young president informed Marshall that an SBC-
employed professor must adhere to doctrines consistent with those of the denomination.384 
He gave her a chance to resign and offered a monetary settlement, which she accepted. The 
president’s action provoked the contempt of students and professors alike; the former held 
demonstrations and prayer vigils in sympathy with Marshall and the latter passed a resolution 
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censuring President Mohler by a vote of 44 to 8.385 Inerrantists, on the other hand, celebrated 
the president’s courage for committing to Southern Baptist principles.386 
In 1995, Southern’s president again drew the scorn of faculty and students. Shortly 
before his instatement as president, Diana Garland, the dean of the Carver School of Church 
Social Work, had listed a faculty opening and selected a candidate for nomination. Since the 
candidate professed his adherence to biblical inerrancy and his opposition to both abortion 
and homosexuality, Garland felt sure that he would be a shoo-in for the position. However, 
President Mohler ultimately blocked his nomination due to his support for women’s 
ordination.387 Following this decision, the dean distributed a four-page document to the 
media outlining the disaster she felt the president’s restrictive faculty selection criteria 
spelled for Carver and the seminary at large. Moreover, she organized a public demonstration 
against President Mohler for his “abuse of power.”388 Southern’s Trustees and Mohler felt 
that it was inappropriate for her to take this matter directly to the public. Thus, Garland’s 
release of “private and privileged information” precipitated her dismissal as dean.389 Many 
professors subsequently accepted early retirement and the seminary experienced a massive 
turnover in faculty, giving President Mohler the opportunity to remold the seminary into a 
staunchly inerrantist institution.390 Inerrantists lauded the president’s boldness and praised 
his restoration of Southern Seminary back into its original image.391 
After moderates retreated from SBC affairs, Falwell paraded in. Before he joined the 
Convention in 1996, the Lynchburg pastor received two invitations to speak at the Pastors’ 
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Conferences, recruited inerrantists including former SBC Presidents Bailey Smith and Jerry 
Vines to serve as Trustees of Liberty University, and even invited Paige Patterson to become 
president of Liberty’s seminary.392 Falwell’s church began making monthly contributions to 
the Convention in 1996, which effectively made Thomas Road Baptist Church a Southern 
Baptist church.393 Two years later, the Lynchburg pastor appeared with seven fellow church 
members as first-time official SBC messengers. When asked about his sudden enthusiastic 
support for the SBC, Falwell responded, “Now there is no reason at all for any Bible-
believing independent conservative Baptist church not to become a part of the SBC.”394 He 
saw the inerrantist movement in the SBC as the Convention’s return to historical orthodox 
Christianity. Indeed, Southern Baptists now comprised more than half of Liberty’s Trustees, 
roughly half of its students, and over seven hundred of its graduates. Thus, it made perfect 
sense when Falwell committed Liberty University to the SBC in 1999.395 
 When Paul Kenley of Texas Baptists Committed remarked that the events of the 1998 
convention solidified the SBC’s “steadfast course to the right,” he was not referring only to 
Falwell’s SBC membership.396 Messengers voted in favor of appending what became known 
as the “family amendment” to the 1963 BFM statement.397 The framers of the amendment 
defined marriage as “the uniting of one man and one woman in covenant commitment for a 
lifetime.” This statement clearly signified inerrantists’ official denunciation and prohibition 
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of homosexuality. Further, that the woman should serve as her husband’s “helper in 
managing the household and nurturing the next generation” precluded her ability to be 
ordained as a pastor. In effect, the statement’s crafters maintained that a woman’s purpose 
lay in the household; if a wife served as church pastor, she would in turn be neglecting her 
duties to her husband and her kids. Moreover, as Barry Hankins noted, another clause 
suggested an explicit pro-life stance: “Children, from the moment of conception, are a 
blessing and heritage from the Lord.” Any thought of abortion, therefore, would be out of the 
question.398 Lastly, since SBC inerrantists backed up each of the aforementioned positions 
with Scripture, they ensured that to argue with them would be to argue with the Bible.399 
Inerrantists constructed an impenetrable fortress. Anyone who disagreed with them about 
these three issues could enjoy no place in the Convention; opponents would be judged as 
denying biblical inerrancy.  
Whereas the 1963 BFM statement revealed agency heads’ penchant for doctrinal 
liberty, the 2000 statement explicitly outlined inerrantists’ affinity for biblical inerrancy and 
its nonnegotiable political implications. At the 1999 convention, messengers approved the 
motion that President Paige Patterson appoint a committee for the purpose of revising the 
1963 BFM statement. He subsequently appointed former SBC Presidents Vines and Rogers, 
Southern’s President Mohler, and Richard Land to the committee. When the committee 
brought its recommendations to the 2000 convention, messengers overwhelmingly adopted 
the revised BFM statement.400 In addition to enshrining the family amendment in the 2000 
statement, the 1999 committee eliminated the 1963 BFM’s ambiguities about the inerrancy 
of the Bible. They unabashedly claimed that “all Scripture is totally true and trustworthy” 
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and “all Scripture is testimony to Christ, who is Himself the focus of divine revelation.”401 
Strengthening the statement already made in the family amendment, the committee left 
virtually no room for differing interpretations over women’s ordination. “While both men 
and women are gifted for service in the church, the office of pastor is limited to men as 
qualified by Scripture.” The bitter contestation over gendered roles in the Southern Baptist 
church that had reached a peak in the 1980s was now dealt a decisive death blow. Moreover, 
in the article entitled “The Christian and the Social Order,” the committee exhorted Southern 
Baptists to oppose homosexuality and “speak on the behalf of the unborn.”402 Inerrantists had 
completed their mission. 
From the early 1960s to 1990, the subgroups of the SBC plainly prized different 
traditions. Since agency heads prized doctrinal liberty, inerrantists and moderates could cling 
to their respective traditions all under the Southern Baptist umbrella. Once inerrantists could 
financially afford to pay more attention to the affairs of the Convention, they quickly 
perceived that their beloved traditional conservatism was not given a favorable hearing in the 
seminaries. They were disgusted that a portion of their tithes went to the Cooperative 
Program, which funded the seminaries. Even though doublespeak had been employed for 
decades by Southern Baptist professors, inerrantists finally caught on in the 1940s and 1950s. 
By the outbreak of the Elliott Controversy, they had begun networking with other 
inerrantists. The onset of the Broadman Controversy, however, marked the real turning point. 
From there on out, inerrantists began networking, campaigning, and building organizations 
with evangelicals outside of the Convention.  
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It is not coincidental that conventions throughout the 1970s and 1980s generally 
featured heated debates about biblical inerrancy and abortion, homosexuality, or women’s 
ordination. This clearly indicated that inerrantists believed that the seemingly disparate issues 
were intertwined. Although the leaders of the BJCPA and CLC fought passionately for their 
traditional views of church and state, arguing that social issues belonged within the realm of 
the state, inerrantists interpreted these issues as church issues. It infuriated them that agency 
heads worded resolutions in such a way as to appease all parties, since these were issues that 
inerrantists perceived as state-supported threats to the church. Consequently, agency heads 
made the situation worse by allowing an ongoing dialogue about these issues. Since 
inerrantists interpreted abortion, the ERA, and homosexuality as societal ills, the 
establishment’s refusal to firmly stand against all of them signaled weakness; inerrantists 
could not bear the thought of their Convention conforming to the image of the surrounding 
culture. 
Inerrantists’ work with Jerry Falwell signaled the most direct link to the outside 
evangelical world. Their service on the same committees and support for the Republican 
Party revealed that this was not a distinctively Southern Baptist phenomenon. The Inerrancy 
Controversy mimicked the move to political activity by evangelicals around the nation. 
While moderates and agency heads fought to save the traditions of the SBC, inerrantists 
labored to transform the Convention into a vehicle that could protect the church and 
simultaneously save the culture. Again, that inerrantists thought the culture needed saving 
was another stark difference between them and their opponents. The evidence for traditional 
claims that inerrantists' motives were purely political can just as likely be used to suggest the 
alternative; they engaged in politics out of theological concerns. Once they sealed their 
 102 
victory in 1990, inerrantists did not abandon their emphasis on biblical inerrancy. On the 
contrary, they permanently enshrined it in SBC legislation alongside their firm stances on 
social issues. The Inerrancy Controversy in the SBC represented one important piece of a 
burgeoning and encompassing Religious Right, a movement that wed religion and politics 
together. 
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